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Abstract3
Using a small-scale microfounded DSGE model with Markov switching in shock variances and4
policy parameters, we show that the data-preferred description of US monetary policy is a time-5
consistent targeting rule with a marked increase in conservatism after the 1970s. However, the6
Fed lost its conservatism temporarily in the aftermath of the 1987 stock market crash, and again7
following the 2000 dot-com crash and has not subsequently regained it. The high inflation of the8
1970s would have been avoided had the Fed been able to commit, even without the appointment9
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1. Introduction1
It is common practice to adopt a simple Taylor (1999)-type instrument rule to describe2
monetary policy when estimating DSGE models. This practice, however, is inconsistent3
with the claim of practitioners, that no central bank actually adopts such instrument rules,4
but rather prefer to set clear objectives and follow ‘elaborate decision making-processes, in5
which huge amounts of data are elaborated and processed’ (Svensson, 2003, pp. 428) in6
attempting to achieve those objectives. By specifying policy objectives the central bank7
adopts — using Svensson’s terminology — a general targeting rule. This general targeting rule8
is then developed into a specific targeting rule by maximizing these objectives subject to9
the equations describing the decentralized equilibrium of the economy. The targeting rule10
that emerges is dependent on the degree of commitment the central bank possesses. What11
that degree of commitment is in practice, and whether or not we can develop data-coherent12
targeting rules, remains an open question, with the literature containing mixed results.13
This paper considers various descriptions of policy — both instrument and targeting rules14
— and takes seriously the notion that policy making and the shocks hitting the US economy15
have been subject to shifts over the years. Doing so gives a far clearer indication as to which16
policy description best fits the data. This in turn has significant policy implications both in17
terms of designing monetary policy institutions and contributing to the debate on the source18
of the ‘Great Moderation’.19
The estimation demonstrates that the US monetary policy is best described by a time20
consistent targeting rule, labelled as discretion throughout the paper. This policy strongly21
dominates conventional simple instrument rules, as well as alternative forms of targeting22
rule with higher degrees of precommitment. This implies that during the post-WWII period23
the US Fed has not been making any credible policy commitments, either by following the24
Ramsey plan or following a simple instrument rule. The data also reveal that there have been25
changes in the Fed’s degree of anti-inflation conservatism and in the volatilities of shocks26
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hitting the economy. Ignoring these changes reduces the models’ ability to fit the data and1
distorts the ranking of models.2
The results imply that the inferences about shock processes, habit persistence and infla-3
tion indexation change significantly across different policy specifications. Under targeting4
rules, relative to instrument rules, we find that there is a shift in emphasis away from prefer-5
ence shocks towards cost-push shocks in driving the US business cycle. Under discretion this6
greater emphasis on cost-push shocks is not implausible, but is dramatic under commitment.7
Differences in the estimates of structural parameters under targeting rules further reflect the8
need to generate a meaningful policy trade-off, resulting in the degree of habits and infla-9
tion indexation being higher under commitment. In contrast, discretion tends to downplay10
the extent of habits to prevent implausibly aggressive policy responses to the associated11
externality.12
The findings contribute to the literature in two respects. First, they add to the small but13
growing research on the empirical validity of targeting rules. While there are papers which es-14
timate models under commitment (Adolfson et al., 2011 and Ilbas, 2010), discretion (Dennis,15
2004) and an intermediate case of limited commitment, also known as quasi-commitment, as16
in Debortoli and Lakdawala (2016), very few compare the empirical relevance across these17
different targeting rules and with simple instrument rules.1 In contrast to these papers,18
we consider a wide range of policy descriptions, and allow for potential regime switches in19
the monetary policy specification. Doing so explains how different policies interact with20
inferences about shock processes and structural parameters of the model.21
Second, the analysis presented extends the ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ debate to the22
framework of targeting rules. There is a large literature on the ‘Great Moderation’ based23
on simple instrument rules, which finds that breaks in estimated policy rules (Lubik and24
1Adolfson et al. (2011) find that commitment is preferred to a simple instrument rule using Swedish
data. Givens (2012) and Le Roux and Kirsanova (2013) suggest that discretion is marginally preferred to
commitment in the US and UK respectively.
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Schorfheide, 2005, and Boivin and Giannoni, 2006), the implicit inflation target (Favero1
and Rovelli, 2003, Erceg and Levin, 2003 and Ireland, 2007) and/or the volatility of the2
underlying shock processes (Sims and Zha, 2006) help to explain the evolution of inflation3
dynamics across time. Given these findings, we allow for variation in the policy-maker’s4
degree of anti-inflation conservatism, and for switches in the variance of the shock processes,5
when estimating different forms of targeting rule. The best-fitting model implies that US6
monetary policy is best described as being conducted under discretion, with an increase in7
central bank conservatism following the Volcker disinflation period, which is found to have8
occurred in 1982. More importantly, it identifies additional periods of policy change: the9
Fed relaxed policy temporarily in the aftermath of the 1987 stock market crash, and also10
lost conservatism following the 2000 dot-com crash, which it has never regained.11
Finally, the counterfactual analysis using the best-fitting model suggests that the ‘Great12
Moderation’ in output and inflation volatility is due to both a reduction in shock variances13
and an increase in central bank anti-inflation conservatism. Decomposing the relative con-14
tribution of both effects implies that the far greater part of the ‘Great Moderation’ stems15
from the reduction in shock volatilities. More importantly, the counterfactuals show that16
inflation would never have breached 2% in the 1970s had the policy maker had access to a17
commitment technology. The potential gains from moving from discretion to commitment18
are substantial and dominate the gains from increasing central bank conservatism. Ensur-19
ing that the US Fed has access to commitment technologies and that they act to use such20
mechanisms is the ‘good policy’ that policymakers should focus on.21
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines our model and the policy maker’s22
preferences. The various descriptions of policy are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 considers23
data, priors and identification of the model, before presenting the estimation results in24
Section 5. Section 6 contrasts the results to those of Debortoli and Lakdawala (2016).25
Section 7 then undertakes various counterfactual simulation exercises which facilitate an26
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exploration of both the sources and welfare consequences of the ‘Great Moderation’, and also1
an assessment of the potential benefits of further improvements in the conduct of monetary2
policy. Section 8 concludes.3
2. The Model4
The economy is comprised of households, a monopolistically competitive production sec-5
tor, and the government. Full details of the underlying microfoundations of the model are6
given in the online Appendix A and only the linearized model is presented here.27
The household’s optimization gives rise to the labor supply decision8
σXˆt + ϕ(yˆt − zˆt) = wˆt − µˆt, (1)9
and consumption Euler equation10
Xˆt = EtXˆt+1 −
1
σ
(
Rˆt − Etπˆt+1 − Etzˆt+1
)
− ξˆt + Etξˆt+1, (2)11
where Xˆt is habits-adjusted consumption12
Xˆt = (1− θ)
−1(yˆt − θyˆt−1), (3)13
and yˆt denotes output, wˆt is real wages, πˆt is inflation and Rˆt is the nominal interest rate.14
Here σ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ϕ is the inverse of the15
Frisch elasticity and θ is the habit persistence parameter. The process µˆt = τ τˆ t/ (1− τ)16
represents fluctuations in the labor income tax rate which serves as a cost-push shock, zˆt is17
an innovation to non-stationary technology process which serves as a technology shock and18
ξˆt is a preference shock.19
The firms’ optimization decisions, in presence of both price and inflation inertia, give rise20
to a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve21
πˆt = χfβEtπˆt+1 + χbπˆt−1 + κcwˆt, (4)22
2An on-line Appendix contains information on the microfoundations of the model, solution algorithms,
estimation and identification tests.
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where the reduced form parameters are χf = α/Φ, χb = ζ/Φ, κc = (1−α)(1−ζ)(1−αβ)/Φ,1
with Φ = α(1+βζ)+(1−α)ζ, where 1−α is the Calvo (1983) probability of price change, β2
is the households’ discount factor and ζ is the proportion of firms setting prices who follow3
a backward-looking rule of thumb, rather than setting prices optimally.34
Hatted variables indicate that they have been linearized relative to their steady-states.5
The stationarity of the model’s steady state is achieved by scaling by a non-stationary6
technology process discussed in Appendix A. The technology, cost-push and preference shocks7
follow AR(1) processes:8
zˆt = ρ
z zˆt−1 + σzε
z
t , ε
z
t ∼ N(0, 1), (5)9
µˆt = ρ
µµˆt−1 + σµε
µ
t , ε
µ
t ∼ N(0, 1), (6)10
ξˆt = ρ
ξ ξˆt−1 + σξε
ξ
t , ε
ξ
t ∼ N(0, 1). (7)11
The model is then closed with one of the instrument or targeting rules considered in12
Section 3. The Fed’s targeting rule can be inferred from their objectives.13
3. Policy14
The four basic forms of policy considered are a simple instrument rule and three types of15
targeting rule: discretion, timeless commitment and the intermediate case labelled ‘quasi-16
commitment’. Across these alternative policies, the estimation permits changes in inflation17
conservatism by allowing Markov switching in instrument rule parameters, as well as in the18
relative weight given to inflation in the policy objective underpinning targeting rules, as19
detailed in this section.20
3All parameters in this Phillips curve are assumed to be structural, see Gali and Gertler (1999).
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3.1. Instrument Rules1
The instrument rule is a generalized Taylor rule which, following An and Schorfheide2
(2007), is specified as3
R̂t = ρ
RR̂t−1 + (1− ρ
R)[ψ1πˆt + ψ2(∆yˆt + zˆt)] + ε
R
t , (8)4
where the Fed adjusts interest rates in response to movements in inflation and deviations of5
output growth from trend.46
Within the framework of a generalized Taylor rule, potential changes in US monetary7
policy are accounted for by allowing for either changes in the Fed’s inflation target or rule8
parameters. In the former case, following Schorfheide (2005), the measure of excess inflation9
in the Taylor rule, πˆt, removes the inflation target from the data, where that target follows a10
two-state Markov-switching process. In the latter case, when the policy changes are described11
as shifts in rule parameters (ρR, ψ1, ψ2) between two regimes, the procedure developed by12
Farmer et al. (2011) is applied to solve the model.513
3.2. Targeting Rules14
In the empirical analysis it is assumed that the Fed’s objective function takes the micro-15
founded form, although the coefficients on the quadratic terms are freely estimated. Specif-16
ically, the empirical loss function can be written as17
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ω1
(
Xˆt + ξˆt
)2
+ ω2
(
yˆt −
σ
ϕ
ξˆt
)2
+ ωππˆ
2
t + ω3 (πˆt − πˆt−1)
2
)
, (9)18
see Appendix B for its microfoundations. This allows us to flexibly capture Svensson’s19
(2003) notion of a general targeting rule by allowing the central bank to define the relative20
4Rules of this form have not only been found to be empirically useful, but, when suitably parameterized,
can often mimic optimal policy, see, for example, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007). Moreover, by allowing
for an additional policy shock in the interest rate rule relative to the cases of optimal policy, we are further
supporting the simple rule’s ability to fit the data. As we shall see, despite this, discretionary policy is
‘strongly’ preferred by the data.
5The details of the solution algorithm are provided in Appendix C.
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importance of welfare-relevant terms. Strictly speaking, it should not be interpreted as a1
welfare function unless the estimated coefficients coincide with the microfounded weights.2
Given that much of the literature on estimated instrument rules finds that there have3
been significant changes in the conduct of policy over time, targeting rules derived under4
an assumption of unchanging policy maker preferences may be too stylized to capture such5
changes. Therefore, the relative weight on inflation, ωπ, is allowed to be subject to regime6
switching between 1 and a value lower than 1 to capture policy regimes with lower conser-7
vatism. The estimation can therefore assess whether or not the Fed’s attitudes to inflation8
targeting have varied over time. For example, has monetary policy been more conservative9
since the Volcker disinflation? Moreover, accounting for independent regime switching in the10
variances of shocks, σz, σµ, and σζ helps to assess whether the lower interest rates observed11
during 2001-2007 were due to economic conditions, or the result of the Fed putting less12
emphasis on inflation targeting relative to its other objectives.13
When implementing targeting rules, the central bank selects interest rates to minimize14
loss function (9) subject to the structural equations describing private sector behavior, equa-15
tions (1)-(4), and the evolution of shocks. The targeting rules considered include the standard16
cases of discretion and timeless commitment, which are the two polar cases of how well the17
central bank can manage the expectations of the private sector. Under timeless commitment18
the policy maker can make credible promises about the setting of the policy instrument in19
future periods, while under discretion they re-optimize and are expected to re-optimize in20
each period. This implies that under timeless commitment there is a history-dependence in21
policy making arising from these past commitments, which is absent under discretion. The22
empirical implementation of timeless commitment assumes that the targeting rule has been23
in place for a prolonged period.24
The remaining form of targeting rule is quasi-commitment, as developed in Schaumburg25
and Tambalotti (2007) and Debortoli and Nunes (2010). The policymaker may deviate26
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from commitment-based plans with a fixed exogenous probability, known by all agents. The1
current policy maker forms a commitment plan to be followed until randomly ejected, with2
a given probability, from office. At which point a new policy maker will be appointed, and3
a new plan formulated until that policy maker is, in turn, removed. Therefore, the central4
bank can neither completely control the expectations of the private sector, nor perfectly5
coordinate the actions of all future policy makers. This implies that, in contrast to the cases6
of discretion and timeless commitment, in each period there is a policy surprise resulting7
from the fact that expectations are formed as a probability-weighted average of policy with8
and without reneging, while actual policy will either renege or not. Such policy surprises9
imply that outcomes under quasi-commitment are not a probability-weighted average of10
those under discretion and timeless commitment.11
The procedure described by Svensson and Williams (2007) is used to solve for the equi-12
librium dynamics under discretion and timeless commitment with Markov-switching in ob-13
jectives.6 In addition, this solution method is modified to incorporate the case of quasi-14
commitment, as Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) and Debortoli and Nunes (2010) do not15
allow for Markov switching in objectives. Appendix C presents the new algorithm.16
4. Data, Priors and Identification17
The empirical analysis uses US data on output growth, inflation, and nominal interest18
rates from 1961Q1 up to 2008Q3, just before nominal interest rates were reduced to their19
effective lower bound of 0.5% and the first round of quantitative easing was implemented.20
The data used in the estimation are plotted in Figure 3, alongside various counterfactual21
6The Svensson and Williams (2007) algorithm implies that although policy makers can anticipate any
changes in their objectives, they do not attempt to tie the hands of their future selves by altering today’s
policy plan as part of a strategic game, instead they set today’s policy cooperatively with their future selves.
We consider that this algorithm is in line with the conduct of US Fed policy as there may be some evolution in
the consensus surrounding the objectives of monetary policy. However, in other policy making environments,
where interest rate decisions are made by partisan politicians who may alternate in office, this would be less
defensible and the approach of Debortoli and Nunes (2010) would be applicable.
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simulation results which will be discussed below. The estimation strategy is standard and is1
described in Appendix D.2
The priors are presented in Table 1. These are set to be broadly consistent with the3
literature on the estimation of New Keynesian models, in particular for the structural model4
parameters we follow Smets and Wouters (2003). For the Markov-switching instrument rule5
parameters, in line with Bianchi (2013), the priors for the response to output growth and6
the smoothing term are set to be symmetric across regimes, while asymmetric priors are7
chosen for the response to inflation.7 For targeting rules, the relative weights (i.e. ω1, ω2,8
and ω3) on the objective function are assumed to be distributed following beta distributions9
and ωπ is allowed to switch between 1 and a value lower than 1, where the beta distribution10
is used for the latter with a mean of 0.5. The prior for the probability of reneging on past11
promises under quasi-commitment policy, υ, follows Debortoli and Lakdawala (2016) with a12
uniform prior on the interval [0,1]. The parameters, γQ, πA and rA represent the values of13
output growth, inflation and interest rates, respectively, when the economy is in its steady14
state. The prior means of γQ, πA and rA are set to be broadly consistent with their data15
averages during this pre-sample period from 1950Q1 to 1960Q4. Parameter πA is interpreted16
as an inflation target, and it is assumed to be constant for all models except the instrument17
rule model with Markov-switching inflation target, where the priors for πA are set in line18
with Schorfheide (2005). The average real interest rate, rA, determines the discount factor,19
β =
(
1 + rA/400
)−1
.20
[Table 1 around here]21
Finally, it is important to note that all model parameters are identifiable. To demonstrate22
this, the identification tests of Komunjer and Ng (2011a) and Koop et al. (2013) were applied23
to the models which feature both policy and volatility switches. In all cases model parameters24
7This way of setting priors for the switching parameters is also discussed by Davig and Doh (2014), as a
means of introducing a natural ordering of regime-dependent parameters in order to avoid the potential risk
of ‘label switching’, as noted in Hamilton, Waggoner, and Zha (2007).
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are identified, see details in Appendix E. This is in contrast to the identification of parameters1
in larger models, (see the application of these tests to the Smets and Wouters model in Iskrev2
(2010), Caglar et al. (2011) and Komunjer and Ng (2011b), respectively) which is one reason3
why we prefer to work with a simpler model.4
5. Results5
This section presents the results of the estimation. It begins by identifying which de-6
scription of policy best fits the data. It then discusses the implications of this for inferences7
about structural parameters of the economy, which shocks drive the business cycle in the8
US, and whether the Fed’s preferences have changed over time.9
5.1. Policy, Structural Parameters and Shocks10
The posterior means and the 90% confidence intervals are presented in Table 2 where11
each column corresponds to an alternative policy description, and these columns are ordered12
according to the log marginal likelihood values calculated using Geweke (1999) and Sims13
et al. (2008), respectively.14
[Table 2 around here]15
The first column of results in Table 2 is for the best-fitting model, which is discretionary16
policy. Following Kass and Raftery (1995) the evidence in favor of discretion relative to17
instrument rules with switches in rule parameters is identified as ‘strong’, and relative to18
timeless commitment as ‘decisive’. The probability of reneging on policy promises under the19
quasi-commitment policy is υ = 0.29, which implies that the commitment plan is expected20
to last for just 10 months. These estimates suggest that the discretionary form of targeting21
rule best fits the data, and there is no evidence of any commitment behavior on the part of22
the Fed.23
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The estimates obtained under the conventional instrument rule are broadly in line with1
other studies: an intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ = 2.9, a measure of price sticki-2
ness, α = 0.77, implying that price contracts typically last for one year; a relatively modest3
degree of price indexation, ζ = 0.09, a sizeable estimate of the degree of habits, θ = 0.834
and an inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity of ϕ = 2.4. Moving to the case of discretion,5
these deep parameter estimates remain largely the same, except that there is a significant6
decline in the degree of habits in the model, which falls to θ = 0.39, and a modest increase7
in the degree of indexation in price setting to ζ = 0.16. The quasi-commitment policy de-8
livers similar values for these parameters. However, with a further increase in the degree of9
precommitment to the case of strict timeless commitment, the degree of indexation rises to10
ζ = 0.26, while the extent of habit persistence increases to a level closer to that observed11
under instrument rules, θ = 0.69.12
These differences in the estimated structural parameters across targeting rules reflect the13
need to ensure the policy maker faces a meaningful trade-off. In the benchmark New Keyne-14
sian model it is only cost-push shocks which present a trade-off between output and inflation15
stabilization for the policy maker. All other shocks would result in policy responses which16
perfectly stabilize inflation. Introducing a habits externality breaks this ‘divine coincidence’17
and implies other shocks will matter to the policy maker. Therefore, in order to explain18
the observed volatility in inflation, the estimation under timeless commitment retains the19
degree of habits relative to instrument rules. This increases the ability of shocks, other than20
the cost-push shock, to generate inflation volatility. In such an environment the degree of21
inflation indexation is also likely to affect these policy trade-offs.22
The case of discretion is more subtle. The inability to commit to a small but sustained23
response to shocks implies that in the presence of the habits externality the policy maker24
will react aggressively to such shocks, see Leith, Moldovan, and Rossi (2012). This would25
imply higher interest rate volatility than is observed in the data. Therefore, the estimation26
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downplays the extent of habits under discretion, relative to timeless commitment.1
In addition to variations in the degree of habits and inflation indexation across the es-2
timates obtained under targeting rules, the balance between different shocks also changes.3
Again, this reflects the need to generate meaningful policy trade-offs in order to explain the4
inflation volatility observed in the data. Therefore, we see a reduction in both the persis-5
tence and standard deviation of preference shocks under targeting rules relative to instrument6
rules. At the same time, the persistence and standard deviation of cost push shocks increase,7
dramatically so in the case of timeless commitment. However, it is important to note that8
under discretion the unconditional variance of this shock is not dissimilar to those found in9
other studies employing instrument rules as their description of policy.810
To summarize, relative to conventional instrument rules, our preferred targeting rule11
adjusts structural and shock parameter estimates to create a meaningful trade-off for policy12
when explaining macroeconomic volatility. This includes a shift from preference to cost push13
shocks in explaining the US business cycle.14
5.2. Inflation Conservatism15
The results suggest that the Fed’s stance on inflation targeting has varied over the sample16
period. Taking into account potential switches in shock volatilities, for each policy specifica-17
tion, the estimation identifies two distinct inflation targeting regimes with a different degree18
of conservatism. We label them ‘more’ and ‘less’ conservative regimes, depending on the19
size of the weight on inflation, ωπ, under targeting rules. Under all targeting rules, ωπ is20
more than halved in the less conservative regime from the default level of one in the more21
conservative regime.22
8It should be noted that the cost-push shock enters the Phillips curve with the reduced form coefficient
κc, which lies in the range 0.036-0.065 across our estimates. Calculating the unconditional variance of the
normalized cost-push process κcµˆt for discretion implies that the variance of 0.002 and 0.017 in low and
high volatility regimes, respectively, is lower than that estimated by Smets and Wouters, 2003 for a single
volatility regime (0.0217). For the case of quasi-commitment the corresponding numbers are 0.0012 and
0.014. However, commitment requires substantial increases in the unconditional variance of the cost push
shock to 0.16 and 0.65 for the low and high volatility regime, respectively.
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As for instrument rules with either Markov-switching rule parameters or inflation targets,1
a ‘less’ conservative inflation regime can be also identified by observing a reduction in the size2
of the coefficient on excess inflation, ψ1, or an increase in inflation target, π
A, respectively.3
In the former case, although policy satisfies Taylor principle across both regimes, ψ1 falls4
from 2.124 to 1.219, while for the latter case, πA rises from 3.34% to 4.33%.5
We now explore when these less conservative inflation regimes were estimated to have6
occurred. Figure 1 plots the smoothed probabilities of being in the less conservative targeting7
regime, as well as being in the high volatility regime. In the case of quasi-commitment, the8
plot also shows the probability that the policy maker has reneged on previous commitments.9
[Figure 1 around here]10
The best-fitting model, discretion, provides more information than the instrument rule-11
based models on the conduct of monetary policy over recent years, as the smoothed prob-12
abilities show. The estimation finds the relaxation of monetary policy in the 1970s that is13
well documented in the existing literature following Clarida et al. (1998). However, unlike14
the vast majority of the literature our estimates date the Volcker disinflation as occurring in15
1982 rather than 1979.9 Additionally, the smoothed probabilities from this model also sug-16
gest that policy was relaxed briefly following the stock market crash of October 1987. More17
interestingly, a prolonged reduction in the Fed’s weight on the inflation target is identified18
as occurring at the time of dot-com crash and persisting all the way through to the financial19
crisis. Such a pattern is not so apparent in the instrument rule-based models. Similarly,20
the less conservative policy episodes are largely confined to the mid to late 1970s under21
timeless commitment. Quasi-commitment utilizes two mechanisms to capture a relaxation22
in the Fed’s anti-inflation stance. Specifically, we may observe a reduction in the weight23
attached to inflation stabilization in the objective function (lost conservatism) or periods24
9More recent papers also find that the date of the Volcker disinflation is later than previously thought.
See, for example, Bianchi (2013), Schorfheide (2005).
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of reneging on past policy commitments. Relative to discretion, quasi-commitment relies1
on extensive periods of lost conservatism to such an extent that it is easier to define when2
conservatism was not lost under this policy description — briefly in the early 1980s and a few3
years prior to the bursting of the dot-com bubble — and even then, not fully. In addition, the4
quasi-commitment estimates imply that the Fed reneged on policy commitments relatively5
frequently in the 1970s, and was showing signs of having possibly done so in the lead up to6
the financial crisis too.7
5.3. The Importance of Switches in Policy and Volatilities8
Turning to explore how important accounting for both the switches in policy and shock9
volatilities are for our estimated results, Table 3 re-estimates our models without allowing for10
either form of switching.10 In this case, the simple instrument rule is preferred by the data,11
but only marginally. This is because targeting rules are heavily penalized by being prevented12
from accounting for the less conservative policy in the 1970s. The ranking amongst targeting13
rules also changes: quasi-commitment is preferred to discretion with timeless commitment14
struggling to fit the data. The apparent superiority of quasi-commitment relative to other15
forms of targeting rule is due to the presence of policy surprises. Without allowing for16
switches in shock volatilities these policy surprises, largely identified during the 1970s, serve17
as an additional shock to increase the ability of the model to fit the data. Once switches18
in shock volatilities are introduced in Table 2, quasi-commitment loses this advantage over19
instrument rules and discretion.20
[Table 3 around here]21
Introducing the possibility of policy switches, but not switches in the volatility of shocks,22
highlights several interesting features of the benchmark estimates that would be otherwise23
10Here we only present selected parameters. The complete set of parameter estimates is given in Appendix
G.
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missed, see Table 4.1
[Table 4 around here]2
First, the ranking of policies changes again: the policy switches can account for the less3
conservative regime in the 1970s enabling discretion and quasi-commitment to dominate4
instrument rules.5
Second, the differences between the less and more conservative regimes are greater than6
in the case in Table 2, where the switches in shock volatilities are present. Without volatility7
switching, as shown in Table 4, the instrument rule does not satisfy the Taylor principle in8
the less conservative regime. This mirrors the findings of Sims and Zha (2006) who warn of9
the biases that may be introduced by failing to account for heteroscedasticity in the error10
terms. For the instrument rule with switches in the inflation target, the differences in the11
targets are also widened. Similarly, for the targeting rules, the relative weight on inflation12
falls by more across all policy descriptions in the less conservative regime. These results13
support a generalization of the arguments in Sims and Zha (2006) that failure to account14
for shifts in shock volatility may overstate the apparent weakness in policy during certain15
periods.16
Third, not including switching in shock volatilities also leads to a loss of nuance in the17
identification of periods with less conservative regime under discretion. Without volatility18
switches all policy descriptions pick up the high inflation in the 1970s as being the result of19
a less conservative targeting regime, and that this episode ends with the Volcker disinflation20
somewhere between 1979 and 1982, see Figure G1 in Appendix G. However, when we combine21
volatility shifts with policy shifts there are additional periods where the Fed appears to have22
lost conservatism.11 These are often associated with well known periods of stock market23
volatility, specifically in 1987 and following the bursting of the dot-com bubble.24
11There are less extensive periods of reduced conservatism under quasi-commitment when we do not allow
for switches in shock volatilities. In essence, the less conservative regime under quasi-commitment allows
the estimation to accommodate higher shock volatilities without inducing an overly aggressive and therefore
data-incoherent policy response during reneging periods.
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To summarize, with no switching in objectives the targeting rules find it more difficult to1
account for the inflation of 1970s than instrument rules. Adding switches in policy objectives2
results in discretion dominating all other forms of policy, see Table 4. Allowing for switches in3
shock volatilities, policy surprises generated by quasi-commitment policy become relatively4
less effective in explaining the data. As a result, quasi-commitment moves further down in5
the ranking of the data-preferred policies as shown in Table 2.6
6. Comparison with Debortoli and Lakdawala (2016)7
Our estimates imply that discretion dominates all other descriptions of policy. This is8
in contrast to the conclusions of Debortoli and Lakdawala (2016) who argue that the data9
reject both discretion and timeless commitment, preferring quasi-commitment. They reach10
this conclusion based on the fact that the estimated probability of reneging on past promises11
does not tend to either zero or one in estimation. This section seeks to explore the reasons12
underpinning the apparent disparity in conclusions.13
The first thing to note is that our estimates of the probability of reneging on past policy14
commitments are not dissimilar to theirs. However, the fact that the estimates do not tend15
to the limiting case of discretion does not imply that quasi-commitment dominates discretion16
in terms of its ability to explain the data. Instead, the Bayes factor implies that discretion is17
decisively preferred to quasi-commitment. The reason for this is that the quasi-commitment18
model is not actually an intermediate case lying between the cases of timeless commitment19
and discretion, as discussed before in Section 3.2. Instead, it introduces policy surprises20
— serving as a new kind of policy shock — which arise from the fact that economic agents21
form expectations based on the probability of experiencing a reneging regime in the next22
period. The realization or otherwise of the reneging regime is then always a shock relative23
to these expectations. When the probability of reneging is low, economic agents expect the24
policy maker to keep their promises so that reneging offers the policy maker the opportunity25
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to exploit those expectations generating a sizeable policy shock. Conversely, when there1
is a high probability of reneging, the policy maker makes more extreme policy promises2
to retain a desirable influence over expectations which, in turn, imply a large policy shock3
whenever the policy maker keeps that promise (see Schaumburg and Tambalotti, 2007). The4
estimated probability of reneging needs to balance these two scenarios to produce policy5
shocks that match the volatility in the data. As discussed in Section 5.3, once switches in6
shock volatilities are allowed, there is less need to rely on such policy shocks to fit the data.127
Finally, we can check that our results are not driven by adopting an objective function8
which takes the form of the microfounded objective function (9) rather than the simpler9
specification used in Debortoli and Lakdawala (2016). We consider two forms of ad hoc10
objective function based on11
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
πˆ2t + ωyyˆ
2
t + ωR
(
∆Rˆt
)2)
. (10)12
Loss function type I excludes the term in the interest rate smoothing, ωR = 0, and only13
retains terms in inflation and the output gap. Loss function type II allows the interest rate14
smoothing term ωR to be estimated.15
[Table 5 is around here]16
In Table 5 we compare four policies, all excluding Markov switching in policy objectives17
but including switching in shock volatilities, as in Debortoli and Lakdawala (2016). Discre-18
tion with objectives in a microfounded form dominates the three cases of quasi-commitment,19
with type I and II ad hoc objectives and the case with objectives in a microfounded form20
(9) used throughout the paper.21
Three clear messages emerge from this comparison. First, with objective function (9)22
discretion dominates quasi-commitment. Again, this confirms that when switches in shock23
12The quasi-commitment estimation also adds complexity to the model in the form of an additional
estimated parameter, the need to estimate the probability that we have observed a reneging regime in each
period and the scale of the state-space representation of the model relative to the discretionary case. This
complexity is penalized in the construction of the Bayes factors.
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volatilities are accounted for the policy-surprise shocks generated by quasi-commitment are1
less effective in fitting the data.2
Second, adding the interest rate smoothing term significantly raises the ability of quasi-3
commitment to fit the data. Quasi-commitment using the type II ad hoc objective achieves4
a better fit compared to the other two cases of quasi-commitment. However, the estimated5
weight on the smoothing term is implausibly large, ωR = 1.5 as the estimation seeks to limit6
the sharp movements in the policy instrument implied by the policy shocks described above.7
If we remove the interest rate smoothing term (type I ad hoc), then such policy results in8
the worst fit out of the four cases considered in Table 5.9
Third, quasi-commitment policies with ad hoc welfare objectives identify similar proba-10
bilities of reneging and periods of high volatility as the quasi-commitment policy presented11
in Table 2, see Figure G2 in Appendix G.12
7. Counterfactuals13
The best-fitting model is obtained under discretionary policy with Markov switching in14
the weight on inflation target in the policy maker’s objectives, as well as switches in the15
volatility of shocks hitting the economy. This allows us to undertake various counterfactual16
exercises. For example, exploring what the outcomes would have been if shock volatilities17
had not declined in the 1980s, or what would have happened had the Fed adopted a tougher18
anti-inflation stance in the 1970s. Moreover, this section explores how much further economic19
outcomes would have improved had the policy maker not only adopted tougher anti-inflation20
policies in the 1980s, but also been able to act under timeless commitment.21
7.1. Good Luck22
The series of counterfactuals begins by analyzing the role of good luck in stabilizing23
US output and inflation. To do so the pattern of switches in policy regimes is fixed as24
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estimated, but the counterfactual sets the volatility of shocks at their high or low values.1
The estimated shocks are therefore re-scaled by the relative standard deviations from the2
high and low volatility regimes. Panel A of Figure 2 plots the actual and counterfactual3
series for inflation, interest rates and output growth. We can see that the high volatility4
of shocks plays a significant role in raising inflation during the 1970s. In the absence of5
these high volatility shocks, inflation would never have risen above 5%. In addition, it is6
apparent that output growth fluctuations could have been dampened if policy makers had7
had the ‘good luck’ of experiencing the low shock volatility regime during the 1970s and8
early 1980s. Moreover, it is also notable that under the policy regimes estimated in the post-9
Volcker period, inflation and output fluctuations would not have changed too dramatically10
regardless of the magnitude of shocks. This may be an indication that tougher anti-inflation11
policies in the 1980s helped stabilize the US economy.12
[Figure 2 around here]13
7.2. Conservative Monetary Policy14
The second set of counterfactual analyses assesses the impact that increased conservatism15
would have had on US inflation and output, especially during the 1970s. To simulate the set16
of counterfactual variables we subject the economy to the sequence of estimated shocks, but17
set the weight on inflation in the policy maker’s objective function, ωπ, to either its default18
value of one in the more conservative regime, or to 0.436 in the less conservative regime,19
throughout the sample period. The first two pictures in Panel B of Figure 2 plot the actual20
and counterfactual series for inflation and interest rates. The third picture plots the output21
loss, which is the difference between model implied output with estimated objective function22
weights and the counterfactual output when the policy maker is more conservative.23
Panel B of Figure 2 shows that even if the Fed had adopted a tougher anti-inflation stance24
in the 1970s, it would not have been able to completely avoid higher inflation, but observed25
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inflation would have been significantly lowered at a cost of higher output losses. Similarly,1
the two periods of rising inflation that occurred following the stock market crash of 1987 and2
the bursting of the dot-com bubble could also have been mitigated if the Fed had maintained3
its stance on inflation targeting. The counterfactual paths for interest rates largely reflect4
the tightness or slackness of policy implied by the alternative scenarios. However, since5
the effective stance of monetary policy is reflected in the real interest rate, the path for6
nominal interest rates under the less conservative policy are above those implied by the7
more conservative policy, reflecting the latter’s success in controlling inflation.8
7.3. The Value of Commitment9
Finally, Panel C of Figure 2 assesses the implications of moving from discretion to timeless10
commitment. Both the shock volatility and policy switches follow their estimated realiza-11
tions, but we change whether or not the policy maker has access to a timeless commitment12
technology. The results are striking. If the Fed had been able to make credible policy com-13
mitments in the 1970s, even although it was subject to high volatility shocks and had a14
reduced weight on the inflation target in that period, inflation would have remained below15
2% throughout the sample period. Although it appears that there would have been non-16
trivial losses in output with a peak loss of around 1% by the mid 1970s, the welfare analysis17
in the next section suggests that these losses are more than compensated for by the reduction18
in inflation volatility.19
7.4. Welfare Analysis20
In addition to providing the counterfactual figures above, it is insightful to compute21
the unconditional variances of key variables and the value of unconditional welfare (using22
both the estimated policy objective (9) and the fully microfounded objectives where the23
weights are microfounded functions of the estimated structural parameters of the model)24
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under alternative counterfactuals.1
As a benchmark case we consider the worst case scenario where the economy is perma-2
nently in the high shock volatility regime and adopt a less conservative policy with ωπ =3
0.436 under discretion. We can then consider the extent to which ‘good policy’ or ‘good luck’4
alone would be able to stabilize inflation, output and interest rates and improve welfare.5
Table 6 presents variances of output, inflation and interest rate under different conser-6
vatism — volatility scenarios. The degree of conservatism ranges from that estimated under7
the less conservative through the more conservative regimes, both of which are using esti-8
mated policy objective weights, to the extreme level implied by the fully microfounded welfare9
function. Two welfare metrics are used to measure losses, one with estimated weights and10
the other with microfounded weights.11
[Table 6 around here]12
Panel A in Table 6 shows that under discretion either implementing the ‘more’ conserva-13
tive regime, or enjoying a reduction in shock volatility alone, would reduce by more than half14
the volatility in inflation and interest rates implied by the worst case scenario. However, it15
is the ‘good luck’ that would lead to significant output stabilization and, therefore, achieve16
bigger gains as measured by either the central bank’s estimated or the microfounded welfare17
metrics.18
If the policy maker further increases the level of conservatism to the levels implied by the19
microfounded objectives, there is a striking reduction in inflation volatility to negligible levels.20
However, it significantly worsens output volatility in the high volatility regime. Clearly, the21
Fed has not implemented monetary policy with a degree of inflation conservatism anywhere22
near that implied by microfounded objectives.23
Turning to Panel B of Table 6 we consider the same experiment, but now assume that24
policy is conducted under timeless commitment. In the absence of ‘good luck’, being able25
to act with timeless commitment allows the central bank to almost completely stabilize26
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inflation volatility, but at the cost of moderate increases in output fluctuations. It is also1
important to note that welfare is clearly improved regardless of the degree of central bank2
conservatism. This result suggests that the reduction in inflation volatility achieved by being3
able to act under timeless commitment is such that the issue of conservatism becomes of4
second-order importance. Therefore, the dimension of ‘good policy’ policymakers should5
be concerned with is not the weight given to inflation stabilization in the policy maker’s6
objective function, i.e. the conservatism of the central bank, but rather that they have the7
tools and credibility to effectively pursue a timeless commitment policy and to make time-8
inconsistent promises which they will keep. Finally, under timeless commitment we again9
see substantial decreases in output volatility when there is good luck.10
8. Conclusions11
A time consistent targeting rule — discretionary policy — provides the best fit to the data,12
outperforming conventional instrument rules and the other forms of optimal policy with13
different degrees of precommitment. Bayes factors reveal that there is ‘strong’ evidence in14
favor of this description of policy relative to simple instrument rules, and ‘decisive’ evidence15
relative to targeting rules formed under either timeless commitment or quasi-commitment.16
However, the ranking of policies in terms of fitting the data crucially depends on whether17
or not we account for potential changes in the Fed’s degree of inflation conservatism and18
in shock volatilities. A failure to take into account policy switches hinders the ability of19
targeting rules to account for the monetary policy response to the high inflation of the 1970s20
relative to instrument rules. The absence of variation in shock volatilities exaggerates the21
fit of quasi-commitment because it can rely on policy surprises as a source of volatility. We22
demonstrate how inferences about shock processes, habit persistence and inflation indexation23
change across different policy specifications.24
The preferred model implies that there was an increase in central bank conservatism25
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following the Volcker disinflation period, which is estimated to occur in 1982. This description1
of policy also finds that the Fed relaxed policy temporarily in the aftermath of the 1987 stock2
market crash, and also lost conservatism following the 2000 dot-com crash, which it has never3
regained.4
Based on estimates from the best-fit model, a range of counterfactual simulations are5
undertaken which throw light on various aspects of policy. First, there have been significant6
welfare gains to the conservatism in policy making that was adopted following the Volcker7
disinflation. However, these gains are small compared to those attained from the estimated8
reduction in shock volatilities. Relative to the average rate of inflation of 6.51% in the 1970s,9
a policy maker acting under discretion, but with the higher degree of conservatism observed10
later on in the sample, would have reduced average inflation to 4.71%. In contrast, inflation11
would have been expected to be 3.39% in the same period had the economy been lucky enough12
to have been in the low volatility regime. Second, had the US Fed been able to commit,13
rather than acting under discretion, then in the 1970s the average rate of inflation would14
have been below 2%, regardless of the level of conservatism. Taken together, this suggests15
that attempts to improve monetary policy outcomes should concentrate on ensuring that the16
Fed is able to make and communicate credible promises concerning future policy, and that17
this is of more importance than altering the preferences of the central banker.18
The model employed in the paper was deliberately small scale, capturing the essential19
features of the larger scale models often employed in empirical analyses while facilitating20
the development of intuition. Future research could usefully analyse different countries and21
extend the analysis to larger scale models, using more refined models of the Phillip curve.22
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Table 1: Distribution of Priors
Parameters Range Density Mean Std Dev
inv. of intertemp. elas. of subst. σ R Normal 2.50 0.25
Calvo parameter α [0, 1) Beta 0.75 0.02
inflation inertia ζ [0, 1) Beta 0.50 0.15
habit persistence θ [0, 1) Beta 0.50 0.15
inverse of Frisch elasticity ϕ R Normal 2.50 0.25
AR coeff., taste shock ρξ [0, 1) Beta 0.50 0.15
AR coeff., cost-push shock ρµ [0, 1) Beta 0.50 0.15
AR coeff., productivity shock ρz [0, 1) Beta 0.50 0.15
steady state interest rate rA R+ Gamma 3.5 2
inflation target πA R+ Gamma 3.5 2
steady state growth rate γQ R Nomal 0.52 1
probability of reneging υ [0, 1] Uniform 0.5 0.25
Markov Switching s.d. of shocks
preference shocks σξ(S=1=2) R
+ Inv. Gamma 0.50 5
cost-push shocks σµ(S=1=2) R
+ Inv. Gamma 0.50 5
technology shocks σz(S=1=2) R
+ Inv. Gamma 0.50 5
policy shocks σR(S=1=2) R
+ Inv. Gamma 0.50 5
Markov switching rule parameters
interest rate smoothing ρR(s=1=2) [0, 1) Beta 0.50 0.25
inflation (more conservative) ψ1(s=1) R
+ Gamma 1.50 0.50
inflation (less conservative) ψ1(s=2) R
+ Gamma 1.0 0.50
output ψ2(s=1=2) R
+ Gamma 0.50 0.25
Weights on Objectives
gap term, Xˆt − ξˆt ω1 [0, 1) Beta 0.50 0.15
gap term, yˆt −
σ
ϕ
ξˆt ω2 [0, 1) Beta 0.50 0.15
change in inflation, πˆt − πˆt−1 ω3 [0, 1) Beta 0.50 0.15
inflation, πˆt ωπ(s=2) [0, 1) Beta 0.50 0.15
Markov switching in Inflation Target
inflation target (s = 1) πA(s=1) R
+ Gamma 6 2
inflation target (s = 2) πA(s=2) R
+ Gamma 3 2
Transition Probabilities
policy: remains more conservative p11 [0, 1) Beta 0.90 0.05
policy: remains less conservative p22 [0, 1) Beta 0.90 0.05
volatility: remains with low volatility q11 [0, 1) Beta 0.90 0.05
volatility: remains with high volatility q22 [0, 1) Beta 0.90 0.05
Notes: For policy switches s = 1 is more conservative regime and s = 2 is less conservative
regime. For volatility switches S = 1 is less volatile regime and S = 2 is more volatile regime.
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Table 2: Estimation Results
Parameters Discretion
Rule:
Parameters
Rule:
Target
Quasi-
Commitment
Timeless
Commitment
Model Parameters
σ 2.901
[2.526,3.244]
2.937
[2.564,3.309]
2.934
[2.556,3.301]
2.692
[2.356,3.038]
2.912
[2.480,3.338]
α 0.735
[0.708,0.763]
0.770
[0.742,0.799]
0.775
[0.746,0.804]
0.754
[0.732,0.776]
0.775
[0.748,0.803]
ζ 0.165
[0.069,0.254]
0.088
[0.031,0.142]
0.084
[0.030,0.138]
0.182
[0.096,0.270]
0.262
[0.114,0.419]
θ 0.387
[0.206,0.560]
0.827
[0.702,0.956]
0.790
[0.631,0.950]
0.372
[0.201,0.544]
0.694
[0.304,0.953]
ϕ 2.459
[2.060,2.844]
2.442
[2.030,2.855]
2.424
[2.004,2.838]
2.286
[1.889,2.672]
2.199
[1.782,2.638]
Shock Processes
ρξ 0.830
[0.791,0.870]
0.890
[0.853,0.927]
0.901
[0.866,0.938]
0.893
[0.869,0.919]
0.919
[0.898,0.941]
ρµ 0.939
[0.914,0.963]
0.504
[0.262,0.759]
0.502
[0.252,0.751]
0.923
[0.900,0.948]
0.992
[0.986,0.998]
ρz 0.195
[0.141,0.248]
0.329
[0.228,0.427]
0.359
[0.257,0.462]
0.186
[0.134,0.238]
0.162
[0.106,0.218]
σξ(S=1) 0.425
[0.297,0.546]
0.682
[0.527,0.837]
0.545
[0.390,0.690]
0.495
[0.334,0.649]
0.404
[0.249,0.555]
σξ(S=2) 0.873
[0.599,1.139]
1.467
[1.040,1.888]
1.346
[0.958,1.721]
0.909
[0.652,1.167]
1.224
[0.720,1.757]
σµ(S=1) 0.236
[0.182,0.292]
0.277
[0.169,0.381]
0.276
[0.169,0.383]
0.251
[0.188,0.315]
1.329
[0.737,1.905]
σµ(S=2) 0.684
[0.527,0.840]
0.546
[0.343,0.751]
0.545
[0.390,0.690]
0.864
[0.658,1.065]
2.806
[1.697,3.913]
σz(S=1) 0.512
[0.391,0.622]
0.601
[0.540,0.660]
0.603
[0.542,0.664]
0.433
[0.352,0.515]
0.452
[0.372,0.526]
σz(S=2) 1.064
[0.932,1.193]
1.184
[0.981,1.380]
1.156
[0.977,1.329]
1.034
[0.918,1.148]
0.989
[0.870,1.103]
σR(S=1) — 0.140
[0.124,0.156]
0.146
[0.129,0.162]
− —
σR(S=2) — 0.412
[0.332,0.489]
0.455
[0.379,0.529]
− —
Data Means
rA 0.802
[0.294,1.282]
0.541
[0.189,0.873]
0.509
[0.165,0.828]
0.803
[0.330,1.266]
0.722
[0.257,1.184]
πA(s=1) 1.305
[0.629,1.943]
3.558
[2.986,4.122]
3.336
[2.745,3.948]
1.962
[1.588,2.326]
2.755
[2.303,3.189]
πA(s=2) — — 4.329
[3.662,5.001]
− —
γQ 0.773
[0.669,0.897]
0.713
[0.592,0.832]
0.700
[0.566,0.829]
0.790
[0.697,0.885]
0.828
[0.721,0.931]
continued on the next page
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Table 2: Estimation Results — continued
Parameters Discretion
Rule:
Parameters
Rule:
Target
Quasi-
Commitment
Timeless
Commitment
Policy Parameters
υ — — — 0.290
[0.227,0.355]
—
ρR(s=1) — 0.825
[0.793,0.858]
0.821
[0.793,0.851]
− —
ρR(s=2) — 0.868
[0.779,0.946]
— − —
ψ1(s=1) — 2.124
[1.798,2.447]
2.014
[1.655,2.370]
− —
ψ1(s=2) — 1.219
[0.809,1.635]
— − —
ψ2(s=1) — 0.511
[0.327,0.692]
0.587
[0.381,0.784]
− —
ψ2(s=2) — 0.274
[0.102,0.438]
— − —
ω1 0.380
[0.232,0.534]
— — 0.624
[0.476,0.777]
0.503
[0.320,0.690]
ω2 0.635
[0.468,0.800]
— — 0.749
[0.618,0.884]
0.559
[0.280,0.843]
ω3 0.436
[0.200,0.667]
— — 0.369
[0.141,0.586]
0.454
[0.195,0.695]
ωπ(s=1) 1 — — 1 1
ωπ(s=2) 0.436
[0.279,0.589]
— — 0.301
[0.204,0.395]
0.373
[0.216,0.527]
Markov Transition Probabilities
p11 0.947
[0.903,0.989]
0.964
[0.942,0.988]
0.902
[0.840,0.964]
0.798
[0.715,0.882]
0.978
[0.959,0.997]
p22 0.918
[0.876,0.962]
0.846
[0.812,0.880]
0.812
[0.740,0.889]
0.914
[0.865,0.966]
0.798
[0.722,0.877]
q11 0.952
[0.919,0.986]
0.956
[0.928,0.985]
0.979
[0.960,0.998]
0.907
[0.852,0.962]
0.958
[0.931,0.986]
q22 0.955
[0.910,0.997]
0.843
[0.779,0.910]
0.946
[0.902,0.992]
0.941
[0.905,0.977]
0.933
[0.887,0.976]
Log Marginal Data Densities and Bayes Factors
Geweke −759.78
(1.00)
−764.16
(80.29)
−765.83
(425.76)
−770.29
(3.67e+4)
−793.62
(4.98e+14)
Sims et.al. −759.91
(1.00)
−764.21
(74.08)
−765.95
(422.76)
−770.34
(3.40e+4)
−793.95
(6.12e+14)
Notes: Here and in Tables 3-5 for each parameter the posterior distribution is described by
its mean and 90% confidence interval in square brackets. Bayes Factors for marginal data
densities are in parentheses.
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Table 3: Selected Parameter Estimates - No Switching
Parameters Simple Rule
Quasi-
Commitment
Discretion
Timeless
Commitment
Selected Model Parameters
ζ 0.103
[0.039,0.166]
0.170
[0.087,0.252]
0.156
[0.066,0.241]
0.594
[0.489,0.737]
θ 0.823
[0.685,0.964]
0.421
[0.210,0.627]
0.476
[0.267,0.680]
0.643
[0.444,0.782]
Policy Parameters
υ — 0.556
[0.329,0.816]
— —
ρR 0.791
[0.756,0.826]
— — —
ψ1 1.716
[1.455,1.972]
— — —
ψ2 0.492
[0.290,0.697]
— — —
ω1 — 0.703
[0.552,0.861]
0.458
[0.287,0.627]
0.627
[0.490,0.808]
ω2 — 0.828
[0.727,0.935]
0.758
[0.628,0.901]
0.446
[0.316,0.620]
ω3 — 0.390
[0.163,0.619]
0.451
[0.213,0.692]
0.489
[0.268,0.712]
Data Means
rA 0.706
[0.246,1.139]
0.759
[0.143,1.330]
0.966
[0.352,1.569]
1.088
[0.459,1.540]
πA 4.746
[3.800,5.677]
2.586
[1.899,3.095]
2.656
[1.008,4.221]
4.050
[3.642,4.674]
γQ 0.688
[0.547,0.826]
0.737
[0.613,0.861]
0.716
[0.593,0.835]
0.726
[0.594,0.797]
Log Marginal Data Densities and Bayes Factors
Geweke −841.01
(1.00)
−841.67
(1.94)
−842.49
(4.41)
−855.43
(1.84e+6)
Sims et.al −841.09
(1.00)
−841.54
(1.57)
−842.69
(4.96)
−858.26
(2.85e+7)
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Table 4: Selected Parameter Estimates - Switches in Policy Only
Parameters Discretion
Quasi-
Commitment
Rule:
Parameters
Rule:
Target
Timeless
Commitment
Selected Model Parameters
ζ 0.155
[0.069,0.239]
0.182
[0.091,0.274]
0.102
[0.038,0.163]
0.123
[0.054,0.195]
0.229
[0.078,0.366]
θ 0.479
[0.286,0.835]
0.371
[0.192,0.543]
0.825
[0.698,0.954]
0.810
[0.658,0.961]
0.606
[0.388,0.843]
Policy Parameters
υ — 0.325
[0.239,0.411]
— — —
ρR(s=1) — — 0.746
[0.708,0.786]
0.797
[0.762,0.831]
—
ρR(s=2) — — 0.845
[0.794,0.900]
— —
ψ1(s=1) — — 2.075
[1.824,2.315]
1.805
[1.507,2.097]
—
ψ1(s=2) — — 0.909
[0.621,1.189]
— —
ψ2(s=1) — — 0.483
[0.309,0.645]
0.498
[0.285,0.714]
—
ψ2(s=2) — — 0.245
[0.098,0.393]
— —
ω1 0.259
[0.035,0.414]
0.633
[0.480,0.785]
— − 0.502
[0.331,0.666]
ω2 0.650
[0.460,0.847]
0.759
[0.631,0.893]
— − 0.523
[0.295,0.732]
ω3 0.442
[0.164,0.698]
0.349
[0.126,0.559]
— − 0.460
[0.205,0.710]
ωπ(s=1) 1 1 — − 1
ωπ(s=2) 0.347
[0.219,0.477]
0.348
[0.254,0.440]
— — 0.302
[0.194,0.414]
Data Means
rA 0.766
[0.303,1.213]
0.997
[0.377,1.591]
0.695
[0.276,1.105]
0.662
[0.239,1.054]
0.975
[0.358,1.561]
πA(s=1) 2.683
[1.275,4.022]
2.097
[1.770,2.431]
3.736
[3.183,4.299]
4.234
[3.470,4.995]
3.064
[2.733,3.411]
πA(s=2) — — — 6.058
[5.217,6.862]
—
γQ 0.683
[0.567,0.800]
0.722
[0.598,0.842]
0.677
[0.540,0.808]
0.681
[0.544,0.822]
0.741
[0.619,0.862]
Log Marginal Data Densities and Bayes Factors
Geweke −810.98
(1.00)
−814.83
(47.0)
−825.33
(1.72e+6)
−831.74
(1.04e+9)
−832.85
(3.14e+9)
Sims et.al. −811.24
(1.00)
−814.30
(21.21)
−825.44
(1.46e+6)
−831.81
(8.52e+8)
−832.98
(2.75e+9)
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Table 5: Estimation Results - MS Shocks only
Para-
meters
Discretion
micro-
founded
objective
Quasi-
commitment
Ad Hoc
objective
type II
Quasi-
commitment
micro-
founded
objective
Quasi-
commitment
Ad Hoc
objective
type I
Model Parameters
σ 2.866
[2.503,3.227]
2.588
[2.220,2.944]
2.375
[2.054,2.688]
2.186
[1.851,2.509]
α 0.751
[0.724,0.779]
0.808
[0.788,0.827]
0.787
[0.765,0.808]
0.811
[0.793,0.828]
ζ 0.173
[0.075,0.261]
0.173
[0.089,0.256]
0.194
[0.142,0.243]
0.153
[0.080,0.224]
θ 0.459
[0.220,0.715]
0.495
[0.409,0.580]
0.478
[0.383,0.570]
0.293
[0.233,0.349]
ϕ 2.274
[1.872,2.675]
2.020
[1.577,2.439]
1.793
[1.453,2.137]
2.031
[1.614,2.436]
Shock Processes
ρξ 0.843
[0.810,0.877]
0.822
[0.758,0.891]
0.898
[0.875,0.922]
0.875
[0.842,0.910]
ρµ 0.936
[0.911,0.961]
0.926
[0.891,0.963]
0.930
[0.903,0.957]
0.936
[0.907,0.968]
ρz 0.183
[0.132,0.239]
0.300
[0.215,0.386]
0.194
[0.142,0.243]
0.201
[0.142,0.258]
σξ(S=1) 0.443
[0.311,0.575]
0.510
[0.315,0.709]
0.510
[0.332,0.681]
0.480
[0.340,0.616]
σξ(S=2) 0.898
[0.622,1.171]
1.905
[1.187,2.657]
1.082
[0.747,1.404]
1.186
[0.846,1.509]
σµ(S=1) 0.234
[0.178,0.286]
0.829
[0.433,1.260]
0.317
[0.219,0.411]
0.583
[0.372,0.781]
σµ(S=2) 0.769
[0.579,0.951]
2.247
[1.557,2.910]
1.094
[0.773,1.431]
1.801
[1.345,2.239]
σz(S=1) 0.476
[0.380,0.569]
0.526
[0.441,0.610]
0.450
[0.358,0.542]
0.438
[0.347,0.526]
σz(S=2) 1.064
[0.361,1.189]
0.962
[0.794,1.111]
1.061
[0.937,1.184]
1.024
[0.893,1.148]
Data Means
rA 0.763
[0.277,1.213]
0.732
[0.249,1.218]
0.666
[0.245,1.082]
0.662
[0.241,1.071]
πA 1.706
[0.693,2.643]
2.276
[1.879,2.678]
2.150
[1.674,2.636]
2.481
[2.178,2.793]
γQ 0.789
[0.692,0.885]
0.761
[0.645,0.882]
0.783
[0.682,0.883]
0.786
[0.684,0.887]
continued on the next page
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Table 5: Estimation Results - MS Shocks only — continued
Para-
meters
Discretion
micro-
founded
objective
Quasi-
commitment
Ad Hoc
objective
type II
Quasi-
commitment
micro-
founded
objective
Quasi-
commitment
Ad Hoc
objective
type I
Policy Parameters
υ — 0.194
[0.127,0.261]
0.260
[0.187,0.333]
0.144
[0.110,0.177]
ρR — — − —
ψ1 — — − —
ψ2 — — − —
ω1 0.454
[0.275,0.642]
— 0.746
[0.609,0.882]
—
ω2 0.715
[0.569,0.867]
— 0.819
[0.714,0.927]
—
ω3 0.444
[0.198,0.676]
— 0.402
[0.167,0.633]
—
ωπ 1 1 1 1
ωy — 0.819
[0.711,0.933]
— 0.866
[0.781,0.952]
ωR — 1.533
[0.734,2.349]
— —
Markov Transition Probabilities
p11 0.916
[0.866,0.968]
0.948
[0.902,0.997]
0.900
[0.840,0.964]
0.879
[0.813,0.944]
p22 0.892
[0.849,0.934]
0.959
[0.931,0.986]
0.939
[0.904,0.973]
0.940
[0.903,0.978]
Log Marginal Data Densities and Bayes Factors
Geweke −776.22
(1.0)
−782.97
(854.06)
−792.73
(1.48e+7)
−837.80
(5.54e+26)
Sims et.al −776.23
(1.0)
−782.81
(718.38)
−792.74
(1.49e+07)
−837.64
(4.67e+26)
Note: The prior for ωR is Gamma (1,1) and for ωy it is Beta (0.5,0.15).
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Table 6: Unconditional Variances and Welfare under Alternative Policies and Volatilities
Regime:
(conservatism, volatility)
Output Inflation Interest Rate Welfare Cost
(est. weights)
Welfare Cost
(micro. weights)
A: Discretion
(less, high)∗ 0.147
[0.092,0.228]
2.044
[1.413,3.157]
1.452
[0.936,2.459]
3.726
[2.250,6.554]
1.05%
[0.69%,1.54%]
(more, high) 0.151
[0.100,0.234]
0.698
[0.467,1.00]
0.593
[0.449,0.844]
3.584
[2.126,6.397]
0.41%
[0.30%,0.60%]
(micro, high) 0.177
[0.127,0.259]
0.002
[0.001,0.003]
0.480
[0.403,0.566]
— 0.08%
[0.05%,0.15%]
(less, low) 0.060
[0.036,0.093]
0.798
[0.541,1.231]
0.509
[0.311,0.893]
0.811
[0.485,1.451]
0.17%
[0.11%,0.26%]
(high, low) 0.057
[0.035,0.089]
0.281
[0.179,0.407]
0.223
[0.166,0.322]
0.793
[0.470,1.435]
0.07%
[0.05%,0.115%]
(micro, low) 0.061
[0.042,0.094]
0.001
[0.000,0.001]
0.232
[0.193,0.276]
— 0.02%
[0.01%,0.03%]
B: Timeless Commitment
(less, high) 0.166
[0.112,0.250]
0.053
[0.037,0.081]
0.746
[0.624,0.893]
2.982
[1.588,5.720]
0.13%
[0.09%,0.20%]
(more, high) 0.168
[0.117,0.251]
0.018
[0.012,0.026]
0.697
[0.0.586,0.829]
3.009
[1.616,5.753]
0.10%
[0.07%,0.17%]
(micro, high) 0.179
[0.129,0.261]
0.000
[0.000,0.000]
0.463
[0.387,0.547]
— 0.08%
[0.05%,0.15%]
(less, low) 0.062
[0.040,0.095]
0.023
[0.015,0.033]
0.364
[0.296,0.446]
0.688
[0.377,1.319]
0.03%
[0.02%,0.04%]
(more, low) 0.061
[0.040,0.094]
0.008
[0.005,0.012]
0.341
[0.279,0.414]
0.694
[0.383,1.326]
0.02%
[0.02%,0.04%]
(micro, low) 0.062
[0.042,0.095]
0.000
[0.000,0.000]
0.225
[0.187,0.268]
— 0.02%
[0.01%,0.03%]
Notes: The welfare costs are computed using equation (9) where weights are either es-
timated or microfounded functions of estimated structural parameters. The microfounded
welfare costs are expressed as a percentage of steady-state consumption. For both timeless
commitment and discretionary policy we compute social welfare using regimes and regime
parameters identified for discretionary policy.
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Figure 1: Markov Switching Probabilities: Policy and Volatility Switches
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Figure 2: Counterfactuals
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1
This Appendix contains the detailed explanation of the model (Appendix A), derivation of
the microfounded objective function (Appendix B), description of the algorithms used to solve
the policy problem (Appendix C), details of the estimation strategy (Appendix D), discussion
and application of identification tests (Appendix E), details of the approach to model selection
(Appendix F) and some additional results (Appendix G).
A The Model
The model is a small scale New Keynesian model featuring households who supply labour to
imperfectly competitive firms which are subject to nominal inertia in the form of Calvo (1983)
contracts. In order to introduce the possibility of some intrinsic persistence in the model, house-
holds are assumed to be subject to a habits externality, while some firms may employ simple rules
of thumb when setting prices in a manner which introduces inflation inertia to the NKPC. Below
we describe the micro-foundations of the model in more detail.
A.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households, indexed by k and of measure 1. House-
holds derive utility from consumption of a composite good, Ckt =
(∫ 1
0
(
Ckit
) η−1
η di
) η
η−1
where η
is the elasticity of substitution between the goods in this basket and suffer disutility from hours
spent working, Nkt . Habits are both superficial and external implying that they are formed at the
level of the aggregate consumption good, and that households fail to take account of the impact
of their consumption decisions on the utility of others. To facilitate data-consistent detrending
around a balanced growth path without restricting preferences to be logarithmic in form, we
also follow Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) and An and Schorfheide (2007) in assuming that the
consumption that enters the utility function is scaled by the economy wide technology trend,
implying that household’s consumption norms rise with technology as well as being affected by
more familiar habits externalities. Accordingly, households derive utility from the habit-adjusted
composite good,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[(
Ckt /At − θCt−1/At−1
)1−σ
ξ−σt
1− σ
−
(
Nkt
)1+ϕ
ξ−σt
1 + ϕ
]
,
1
where Ct−1 ≡
∫ 1
0 C
k
t−1dk is the cross-sectional average of consumption.
1 In other words house-
holds gain utility from consuming more than other households, and are disappointed if their con-
sumption doesn’t grow in line with technical progress, At, and are subject to a time-preference
or taste-shock, ξt. Et is the mathematical expectation conditional on information available at
time t, β is the discount factor (0 < β < 1) , and σ and ϕ are the inverses of the intertemporal
elasticities of habit-adjusted consumption and work (σ, ϕ > 0; σ = 1).
The process for technology is non-stationary:
lnAt = lnγ + lnAt−1 + ln zt,
ln zt = ρz ln zt−1 + εz,t.
Households decide the composition of the consumption basket to minimize expenditures, and the
demand for individual good i is
Ckit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Ckt =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η (
Xkt + θCt−1
)
.
By aggregating across all households, we obtain the overall demand for good i as
Cit =
∫ 1
0
Ckitdk =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Ct. (1)
The remainder of the household’s problem is standard. Specifically, households choose the
habit-adjusted consumption aggregate, Xkt = C
k
t /At − θCt−1/At−1, hours worked, N
k
t , and the
portfolio allocation, Dkt+1, to maximize expected lifetime utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[(
Xkt
)1−σ
(ξt)
−σ
1− σ
−
(
Nkt
)1+ϕ
(ξt)
−σ
1 + ϕ
]
,
subject to the budget constraint∫ 1
0
PitC
k
itdi+EtQt,t+1D
k
t+1 =WtN
k
t (1− τ t) +D
k
t +Φt + Tt,
and the usual transversality condition. The household’s period-t income includes: wage income
from providing labor services to goods producing firms, WtN
k
t , which is subject to a time-varying
tax rate, τ t , dividends from the monopolistically competitive firms, Φt, and payments on the
1Note that this utility specification is slightly different from that in Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) who adopt
the following specification, (Ct − θγCt−1)/At)
1−σ (ξt)
−σ/(1−σ). Their specification introduces a technology shock
into the definition of habits adjusted consumption which then complicates the derivation of welfare. Therefore we
adopt a specification which implies habits in detrended variables, which means that the only place the technology
shock appears is in the consumption Euler equation.
2
portfolio of assets, Dkt . Financial markets are complete. Lump-sum transfers, Tt, are paid by the
government. The tax rate, τ t, will be used to finance lump-sum transfers, and can be designed
to ensure that the long-run equilibrium is efficient in the presence of the habits and monopolistic
competition externalities. However, we shall assume that the tax rate fluctuates around this
efficient level such that it is responsible for generating an autocorrelated cost-push shock.
In the maximization problem, households take as given the processes for Ct−1, Wt, Φt, and Tt,
as well as the initial asset position Dk−1. The first order conditions for labor and habit-adjusted
consumption are (
Nkt
)ϕ(
Xkt
)−σ = WtPtAt (1− τ t),
and
1 = βEt
[(
Xkt+1ξt+1
Xkt ξt
)−σ
At
At+1
Pt
Pt+1
]
Rt,
where
Qt,t+1 = β
(
Xkt+sξt+1
Xkt ξt
)−σ
At
At+1
Pt
Pt+1
.
is the one-period stochastic discount factor for nominal payoffs and R−1t = Et [Qt,t+1] denotes the
inverse of the risk-free gross nominal interest rate between periods t and t+ 1.
A.2 Firms
We further assume that intermediate goods producers are subject to the constraints of Calvo
(1983)-contracts such that, with fixed probability (1− α) in each period, a firm can reset its price
and with probability α the firm retains the price of the previous period, but where, following Yun
(1996) that price is indexed to the steady-state rate of inflation. When a firm can set the price, it
can either do so in order to maximize the present discounted value of profits, Et
∞∑
s=0
αsQt,t+sΦit+s,
or it can follow a simple rule of thumb as in (Galí and Gertler, 1999). The constraints facing the
forward looking profit maximizers are the demand for their own good (1) and the constraint that
all demand be satisfied at the chosen price. Profits are discounted by the s-step ahead stochastic
discount factor Qt,t+s and by the probability of not being able to set prices in future periods.
The firm’s optimization problem is
max
{Pit, Yit}
Et
∞∑
s=0
αsQt,t+s (Pitπ
s −MCt+s)Yit+s,
3
subject to the demand system
Yit+s =
(
Pitπs
Pt+s
)−η
Yt+s,
and nominal rigidity.
The relative price set by firms able to reset prices optimally in a forward-looking manner,
satisfies the following relationship
P ft
Pt
=
η
η − 1
Et
∞∑
s=0
(αβ)s
(
Xt+sξt+s
)−σ
mct+s
(
Pt+sπ
−s
Pt
)η
Yt+s
At+s
Et
∞∑
s=0
(αβ)s
(
Xt+sξt+s
)−σ (Pt+sπ−s
Pt
)η−1
Yt+s
At+s
, (2)
where mct =MCt/Pt is the real marginal cost and P
f
t denotes the price set by all firms who are
able to reset prices in period t and choose to do so in a profit maximizing way.
To introduce inflation inertia we allow some firms to follow simple rules of thumb when setting
prices. Specifically, when a firm is given the opportunity of posting a new price, we assume that
rather than posting the profit-maximizing price (2), a proportion of those firms, ζ, follow a simple
rule of thumb in resetting that price
P bt = P
∗
t−1πt−1, (3)
such that they update their price in line with last period’s rate of inflation rather than steady-state
inflation, where P ∗t−1 denotes an index of the reset prices given by
lnP ∗t−1 = (1− ζ) lnP
f
t−1 + ζP
b
t−1.
With α of firms keeping last period’s price (but indexed to steady-state inflation) and (1− α)
of firms setting a new price, the law of motion of this price index is,
(Pt)
1−η = α (Pt−1π)
1−η + (1− α) (P ∗t )
1−η .
We denote the fixed share of price-setters following the rule of thumb (3) by ζ, we derive
a price inflation Phillips curve, as detailed in Leith and Malley (2005). Combining the rule of
thumb of price setters with the optimal price setting described above leads to the price Phillips
curve
πˆt = χfβEtπˆt+1 + χbπˆt−1 + κcwˆt,
where πˆt = ln(Pt) − ln(Pt−1) − ln(π) is the deviation of inflation from its steady state value,
wˆt = ln(Wt/Pt)− lnAt− ln((η− 1)/η) = mˆct, are log-linearized real marginal costs (wages), and
the reduced-form parameters are defined as χf ≡ α/Φ, χb ≡ ζ/Φ, κc ≡ (1−α)(1− ζ)(1−αβ)/Φ,
with Φ ≡ α(1 + βζ) + (1− α)ζ.
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A.3 The Government
The government collects a distortionary tax on labor income which it rebates to households as a
lump-sum transfer. The steady-state value of this distortionary tax will be set at a level which
offsets the combined effect of the monopolistic competition distortion and the effects of the habits
externality, as in Levine, McAdam, and Pearlman (2008), see Appendix B.1. However, shocks
to the tax rate described by
ln(1− τ t) = ρ
µ ln(1− τ t−1) + (1− ρ
µ) ln(1− τ)− εµt
serve as autocorrelated cost-push shocks to the NKPC. There is no government spending per se.
The government budget constraint is given by
τ tWtNt = −Tt.
A.4 The Complete Model
The complete system of non-linear equations describing the equilibrium are given by
Nϕt
(
Xt
At
)σ
=
Wt
AtPt
(1− τ t) ≡ wt(1− τ t), (4)(
Xt
At
)−σ
ξ−σt = βEt
[(
Xt+1
At+1
)−σ At
At+1
ξ−σt+1Rtπ
−1
t+1
]
, (5)
Nt =
Yt
At
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−η
di, (6)
Xt = Ct − θCt−1, (7)
Yt = Ct, (8)
τ tWtNt = −Tt, (9)
P ft
Pt
=
η
η − 1
Et
∞∑
s=0
(αβ)s
(
Xt+sξt+s
At+s
)−σ
mct+s
(
Pt+sπ
−s
Pt
)η
Yt+s
At+s
Et
∞∑
s=0
(αβ)s
(
Xt+sξt+s
At+s
)−σ (
Pt+sπ−s
Pt
)η−1
Yt+s
At+s
, (10)
mct =
Wt
AtPt
, (11)
P bt = P
∗
t−1πt−1, (12)
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lnP ∗t−1 = (1− ζ) lnP
f
t−1 + ζP
b
t−1, (13)
P 1−ηt = α (πPt−1)
1−η + (1− α) (P ∗t )
1−η , (14)
lnAt = lnγ + lnAt−1 + ln zt, (15)
ln zt = ρz ln zt−1 + ε
z
t , (16)
ln(1− τ t) = ρ
µ ln(1− τ t−1) + (1− ρ
µ) ln(1− τ)− εµt , (17)
with an associated equation describing the evolution of price dispersion, ∆t =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−η
di,
which is not needed to tie down the equilibrium upon log-linearization. The model is then closed
with instrument or targeting policy rule as discussed in the main text.
In order to render this model stationary we scale certain variables by the non-stationary level
of technology, At such that kt = Kt/At where Kt = {Yt, Ct,Wt/Pt}. All other real variables are
naturally stationary. Applying this scaling, the steady-state equilibrium conditions reduce to:
NϕXσ = w(1− τ ),
1 = βRπ−1/γ = βr/γ,
y = N = c,
X = c(1− θ),
η
η − 1
=
1
w
.
This system yields
Nσ+ϕ (1− θ)σ = w(1− τ). (18)
which can be solved for N . Note that this expression depends on the real wage w, which can
be obtained from the steady-state pricing decision of our monopolistically competitive firms.
In Appendix B.1 we contrast this with the labor allocation that would be chosen by a social
planner in order to fix the steady-state tax rate required to offset the net distortion implied by
monopolistic competition and the consumption habits externality.
B Derivation of Objective Functional Form
B.1 The Social Planner’s Problem
The subsidy level that ensures an efficient long-run equilibrium is obtained by comparing the
steady-state solution of the social planner’s problem with the steady state obtained in the decen-
tralized equilibrium. The social planner ignores the nominal inertia and all other inefficiencies
6
and chooses real allocations that maximize the representative consumer’s utility subject to the
aggregate resource constraint, the aggregate production function, and the law of motion for habit-
adjusted consumption:
max
{X∗t ,C
∗
t ,N
∗
t }
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (X∗t , N
∗
t , ξt, At)
subject to
Y ∗t = C
∗
t , Y
∗
t = AtN
∗
t ,
X∗t = C
∗
t /At − θC
∗
t−1/At−1.
The optimal choice implies the following relationship between the marginal rate of substi-
tution between labor and habit-adjusted consumption and the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution in habit-adjusted consumption
χ (N∗t )
ϕ (X∗t )
σ = (1− θβ)Et
(
X∗t+1ξt+1
X∗t ξt
)−σ
.
The steady state equivalent of this expression can be written as
χ (N∗)ϕ+σ (1− θ)σ = (1− θβ) .
If we contrast this with the allocation achieved in the steady-state of our decentralized equi-
librium (18) we can see that the two will be identical whenever the tax rate is set optimally to
be
τ∗ ≡ 1−
η
η − 1
(1− θβ).
Notice that in the absence of habits the optimal tax rate would be negative, such that it is
effectively a subsidy which offsets the monopolistic competition distortion. However, for the
estimated values of the habits parameter the optimal tax rate is positive as the policy maker
wishes to prevent households from overconsuming.
B.2 Quadratic Representation of Social Welfare
Individual utility in period t is
Γ0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
X1−σt ξ
−σ
t
1− σ
−
N1+ϕt ξ
−σ
t
1 + ϕ
)
,
where Xt = ct − θct−1 is habit-adjusted aggregate consumption after adjusting consumption for
the level of productivity, ct = Ct/At.
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Linearization up to second order yields
Γ0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
X
1−σ
{
1− θβ
1− θ
(
cˆt +
1
2
cˆ2t
)
−
1
2
σXˆ2t − σXˆtξˆt
}
−N
1+ϕ
{
Nˆt +
1
2
(1 + ϕ) Nˆ2t − σNˆtξˆt
})
+ tip(3),
where tip(3) includes terms independent of policy and terms of third order and higher, and for
every variable Zt with steady state value Z we denote Zˆt = log(Zt/Z).
The second order approximation to the production function yields the exact relationship
Nˆt = ∆ˆt + yˆt , where yt = Yt/At and ∆t =
1∫
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−η
di. We substitute Nˆt out and follow Eser
et al. (2009) in using
∞∑
t=0
βt∆ˆt =
α
1− αβ
∆ˆ−1 +
1
2
∞∑
t=0
βt
αη
(1− βα)(1− α)
(
πˆ2t +
ζα−1
(1− ζ)
[πˆt − πˆt−1]
2
)
to yield
Γ0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
X
1−σ
{
1− θβ
1− θ
(
cˆt +
1
2
cˆ2t
)
−
1
2
σXˆ2t − σXˆtξˆt
}
−N
1+ϕ
(
yˆt +
1
2
αη
(1−βα)(1−α)
(
πˆ2t +
ζα−1
(1−ζ) [πˆt − πˆt−1]
2
)
+12 (1 + ϕ) yˆ
2
t − σyˆtξˆt
) + tip(3).
The second order approximation to the national income identity yields
cˆt +
1
2
cˆ2t = yˆt +
1
2
yˆ2t + tip (3) .
Finally, we use the fact that in the efficient steady-state X
1−σ
(1 − θβ) = (1 − θ)N
1+ϕ
and
collect terms to arrive at
Γ0 = −
1
2
N
1+ϕ
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
σ (1− θ)
1− θβ
(
Xˆt + ξˆt
)2
+ ϕ
(
yˆt −
σ
ϕ
ξˆt
)2
+
αη
(1− βα)(1− α)
(
πˆ2t +
ζα−1
(1− ζ)
[πˆt − πˆt−1]
2
)}
+ tip (3) .
Normalizing the coefficient on inflation to one and changing sign, we arrive at the following
quadratic approximation to the loss function:
L0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
(1− αβ)(1− α)σ (1− θ)
αη (1− θβ)
(
Xˆt + ξˆt
)2
+
(1− βα)(1− α)ϕ
αη
(
yˆt −
σ
ϕ
ξˆt
)2
+ πˆ2t +
ζα−1
(1− ζ)
[πˆt − πˆt−1]
2
}
+ tip (3) .
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C Policy
C.1 Instrument Rule Specification and Solution
The US monetary policy is described by the following instrument rule with Markov-switching
rule parameters (ρR, ψ1, ψ2) between two regimes:
Rt = ρ
R(st)Rt−1 + (1− ρ
R(st))[ψ1(st)πˆt + ψ2(st)(∆yˆt + zˆt)] + ε
R
t . (19)
The algorithm proposed by Farmer et al. (2011) is applied to solve the model. The model can be
recast in the following system
A(st) a1(st)(n−l)×n
a2(st)
l×n
 xt
n×1
=
B(st) b1(st)(n−l)×n
b2(st)
l×n
xt−1
n×1
+
Ψ(st) ψ1(st)(n−l)×k
ψ2(st)
l×k
 zt
k×1
+
Π 0(n−l)×l
I
l×l
 ηt
l×1
, (20)
where xt = [zˆt, µˆt, ξˆt, yˆt, πˆt, Rˆt,Etyˆt+1,Etπˆt+1]
′ is a vector of state variables. Vector zt = [ε
z
t , ε
µ
t , ε
ξ
t , ε
R
t ]
stacks the exogenous shocks and ηt is composed of rational expectation forecast errors. The latent
value st follows an two-state Markov chain, st ∈ {1, 2}, with transition matrix P = [pij ] defined
as
pij = Pr (st = i|st−1 = j) .
Theorem 1 in Farmer et al. (2011) shows that if {Xt, ηt}
∞
t=1 is an MSV solution of the system
(20), then
xt = V (st)F1(st)xt−1 + V (st)G1(st)zt,
ηt = − (F2(st)xt−1 +G2(st)zt) ,
where the matrix
[
A (st)V (st) Π
]
is invertible and
B (st) =
[
A (st)V (st) Π
] [
F1(st) F2(st)
]′
, (21)
Ψ(st) =
[
A (st)V (st) Π
] [
G1(st) G2(st)
]′
, (22)
2∑
i=1
pijF2(st = i)V (st−1 = j) = 0
l×(n−l)
. (23)
Without loss of generality, Farmer et al. (2011) assume that
A (st)V (st) =
[
In−l −X(st)
]′
, (24)
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for some l × (n− l) matrix X(st). Since
F2(st) =
[
0l×(n−l) Il
] [
A (st)V (st) Π
]−1
B(st) =
[
X(st) Il
]
B (st) ,
equation (23) becomes
2∑
i=1
pij
[
X(st = i) Il
]
B (st = i)A (st−1 = j)
−1 [ In−l −X(st−1 = j) ]′ (25)
= 0
l×(n−l)
, j ∈ {1, 2}
Therefore, the problem of finding an MSV solution can be reduced to that of finding the roots
of the quadratic polynomial equation (25). Farmer et al. (2011) use Newton’s method to compute
roots as shown in Algorithm 1 in their paper. Once X(st) is found, V (st) can be subsequently
solved using equation (24). With V (st) obtained, equations (21) and (22) can be used to find
F1(st), F2(st), G1(st) and G2(st) to obtain an MSV solution of the system (20).
To apply this procedure we start with a large number of initial guesses of X(st) to explore all
possible MSV solutions. In addition, we check whether the solutions are mean-square stable and
select the stationary one for our estimation.
C.2 Targeting Rules and Solution
We only present the solution under Quasi-commitment, as discretion and commitment follow
Svensson andWilliams (2007). Moreover, both of them are limiting cases of the quasi-commitment
model.
The model (1)-(4) in the main text belongs to the class of linear models[
I 0
0 Ht+1
][
Xt+1
Etxt+1
]
=
[
A11,t+1 A12,t+1
A21,t A22,t
][
Xt
xt
]
+
[
B1,t+1
B2,t
]
[ut]+
[
Ct+1
0
]
[ǫt+1] , (26)
where Xt = [zˆt, µˆt, ξˆt, yˆt−1, πˆt−1, Rˆt−1]
′ is an n1 × 1 vector of predetermined variables (the state)
in period t, xt = [yˆt, πˆt]
′ is an n2 × 1 vector of forward-looking variables in period t, ut = [Rˆt] is
an np×1 vector of central-bank instruments (control variables) in period t, and ǫt = [εzt , ε
µ
t , ε
ξ
t ] is
an k × 1 vector of zero-mean i.i.d. shocks realized in period t with covariance matrix Σ. Matrix
A22,t is nonsingular. We denote zt = [X
′
t, x
′
t]
′.
The policy objective is a quadratic form:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
z′tWtzt + 2z
′
tUtut + u
′
tRtut
)
.
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Matrices A11,t, A12,t, B1,t, Ct, Ht, A21,t, A22,t, B2,t, Wt, Ut, and Rt (assumed to be of
appropriate dimension) are random and can each take n different values in period t, corresponding
to the n modes jt = 1, 2, ..., n in period t. We denote these values A11,t = A11,jt , A12,t = A12,jt ,
and so forth. The modes jt follow a Markov process with constant transition probabilities:
Pjk ≡ Pr{jt+1 = k|jt = j} (j, k = 1, ..., n).
Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) and Debortoli and Nunes (2010) demonstrate that the
optimization problem can be written as
min
{ut}
∞
t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
(β (1− υ))t
(
z′tWtzt + 2z
′
tUtut + u
′
tRtut + βυX
′
t+1V
d
t+1Xt+1
)
,
subject to
Xt+1 = A11jt+1Xt +A12jt+1xt +B1jt+1ut, (27)
(1− υ)Hjt+1Etxt+1 + υHjt+1Φjt+1Xt+1 = A21jtXt +A22jtxt +B2jtut, (28)
where Φjt and S are components of the solution to the corresponding discretionary problem,
xt = ΦjtXt and the loss is Lt (yt) =
1
2X
′
tV
d
t+1Xt. Here υ is probability of reneging on the previously
chosen plan.
Substitute (27) into (28) to yield
(1− υ)Hjt+1Etxt+1 =
(
A21jt − υHjt+1Φjt+1A11jt+1
)
Xt
+
(
A22jt − υHjt+1Φjt+1A12jt+1
)
xt
+
(
B2jt − υHjt+1Φjt+1B1jt+1
)
ut.
It is straightforward to bring the optimization problem into the minmax form (see Marcet
and Marimon (2011) for the general method and Svensson (2010) for linear-quadratic problems)
max
{γt}
∞
t=0
min
{xt,ut}
∞
t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
(β (1− υ))t L˜t
with
L˜t = z
′
tWjtzt + 2z
′
tUjtut + u
′
tRjtut + βυX
′
t+1V
d
jt+1Xt+1
−γ′t
((
A21jt − υHjt+1Φjt+1A11jt+1
)
Xt
+
(
A22jt − υHjt+1Φjt+1A12jt+1
)
xt +
(
B2jt − υHjt+1Φjt+1B1jt+1
)
ut
)
+
1
β
Ξ′t−1Hjtxt,
11
and
Ξt = γt,
Xt+1 = A11jt+1Xt +A12jt+1xt +B1jt+1ut.
The Bellman equation is:
V (Xt,Ξt−1) = max
γt
min
(xt,ut)
(
L˜t + β (1− υ)V (Xt+1,Ξt)
)
.
Denote
Lˆt = z
′
tWjtzt + 2z
′
tUjtut + u
′
tRjtut +
1
β
Ξ′t−1Hjtxt − γ
′
t (A21jtXt +A22jtxt +B2jtut)
+γ′tυHjt+1Φjt+1
(
A11jt+1Xt +A12jt+1xt +B1jt+1ut
)
,
and
u˜t =
 xtγt
ut
 , X˜t = [ XtΞt−1
]
,
so that
L˜t = Lˆt + βυX
′
t+1V
d
jt+1
Xt+1
and the Bellman equation is
V (Xt,Ξt−1) = max
γt
min
(xt,ut)
(
Lˆt + βυX
′
t+1V
d
jt+1
Xt+1 + β (1− υ)V (Xt+1,Ξt)
)
. (29)
Then
Lˆt =
[
X˜t
u˜t
]′ [
Qjt Njt
N ′jt Rjt
][
X˜t
u˜t
]
,
where
Qjt =
[
W11,jt 0
0 0
]
,
Njt =
[
W12,jt −
(
A21jt − υHjt+1Φjt+1A11jt+1
)′
U1,jt
1
β
Hjt 0 0
]
,
Rjt =
 W22,jt
(
υHjt+1Φjt+1A12jt+1 −A22jt
)′
U2,jt
υHjt+1Φjt+1A12jt+1 −A22jt 0 υHjt+1Φjt+1B1jt+1 −B2jt
U ′2,jt
(
υHjt+1Φjt+1B1jt+1 −B2jt
)′
Rjt
 .
The terms in the RHS of Bellman equation (29) can be written as
βυX′t+1V
d
jt+1
Xt+1 + β (1− υ) X˜
′
t+1Vjt+1X˜t+1 = βX˜
′
tV˜jt+1X˜t+1,
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where
V˜jt+1 =
(
υS′V djt+1S + (1− υ)Vjt+1
)
,
and S =
[
I 0
]
.
The Bellman equation (29), therefore, can be rewritten
X˜ ′tVjtX˜t = maxmin
u˜t
([
X˜t
u˜t
]′ [
Qjt Njt
N ′jt Rjt
][
X˜t
u˜t
]
+ βX˜ ′tV˜jt+1X˜t+1
)
.
Note that Vjt in the LHS is not the same as V˜jt+1 in the RHS, and the constraints can be rewritten
as
X˜t+1 = A˜jt+1X˜t + B˜jt+1 u˜t + C˜jt+1ǫt+1,
where
A˜jt =
[
A11jt 0
0 0
]
, B˜jt =
[
A12jt 0 B1jt
0 I 0
]
,
C˜jt =
[
C
0
]
FOC wrt u˜t yields
0 =
(
N ′jt + βB˜
′
jt+1
V˜jt+1A˜jt+1
)
X˜t +
(
Rjt + βB˜
′
jt+1
V˜jt+1B˜jt+1
)
u˜t = KjtX˜t + Jjt u˜t,
where
Jjt = Rjt + βB˜
′
jt+1
V˜jt+1B˜jt+1 ,
Kjt = N
′
jt + βB˜
′
jt+1
V˜jt+1A˜jt+1 ,
so that optimal policy is
u˜t = −J
−1
jt
KjtX˜t = FjtX˜t.
The iterative algorithm can be written as follows. For each Markov state j and at each
iteration
1. Suppose V =
[
V11 V12
V ′12 V22
]
, V d = V11 and Φ are known. (This is an initial guess which
will be updated in the following steps.)
2. Construct
[
Qjt Njt
N ′jt Rjt
]
, taking into account future states jt+1.
3. Construct A˜jt+1 , B˜jt+1 (use probabilities).
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4. Construct
V˜jt+1=υS
′V djt+1S + (1− υ)Vjt+1 .
5. Find
Jj = Rj + βPjjB˜
′
j V˜jB˜j + β
∑
k 
=j
PjkB˜
′
kV˜kB˜k,
Kj = N
′
j + βPjjB˜
′
j V˜jA˜j + β
∑
k 
=j
PjkB˜
′
kV˜kA˜k,
Vjt = Qjt −K
′
jJ
−1
j Kj + βPjjA˜
′
j V˜jA˜j + β
∑
k 
=j
PjkA˜
′
kV˜kA˜k,
Fj = −J
−1
j Kj .
6. Update Φ = FxX and V = Vjt , V
d = V11 and repeat steps 2-6 until the fixed point is
obtained.
D Estimation Strategy
Our empirical analysis uses the US data on output growth (∆GDPt), inflation (INFt), and
nominal interest rates (INTt) from 1961Q1 up to 2008Q3, just before nominal interest rates were
reduced to their effective lower bound of 0.5%.2 The measurement equations are specified as:
∆GDPt = γ
Q +∆yˆt + zˆt,
INFt = π
A + 4πˆt,
INTt = r
A + πA + 4γQ + 4Rˆt.
In estimation, the likelihood function is approximated using Kim (1994)’s filter due to the
presence of Markov-switching parameters, and is then combined with the prior distribution to
obtain the posterior distribution. Sims (2002) optimization routine CSMINWEL is used to find
the posterior modes. The inverse Hessian is then calculated at these posterior modes and used as
the covariance matrix of the proposal distribution. It is scaled to yield a target acceptance rate
2The specific data series used are the Effective Federal Funds Rate - FEDFUNDS, Gross Domestic Product in
United States-USARGDPQDSNAQ and the Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator-GDPDEF. All data
are seasonally adjusted and at quarterly frequencies. Output growth is the log difference of real GDP, multiplied
by 100. Inflation is the log difference of the associated implicit price deflator, scaled by 400. All data are taken
from the FRED database.
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of 25%-40%. We adopt Schorfheide (2005)’s strategy that employs a random walk Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm to generate 500,000 draws with the first 200,000 draws being discarded before
saving every 20th draw from the remaining draws.3
Finally, the log marginal likelihood values for each model are computed using both the mod-
ified harmonic mean estimator of Geweke (1999) and Sims et al. (2008). The latter is designed
for models with time-varying parameters, where the posterior density may be non-Gaussian.
When estimating commitment we follow Givens (2012) to update the Lagrange multiplies.
Alternatively, Ilbas (2010) and Adolfson et al. (2011) use presample to initialize the Lagrange
multipliers. Both approaches give very similar results.
E Identification Tests
E.1 Komunjer and Ng (2011)
We use the Komunjer and Ng (2011) identification test to analyze the main models presented in
Table 2. Komunjer and Ng (2011) study the local identification of a DSGE model from its lin-
earized solution. Their test uses the restrictions implied by equivalent spectral densities to obtain
rank and order conditions for identification. Minimality and left-invertibility are necessary and
sufficient conditions for identification. In addition, Komunjer and Ng (2011) discuss the identi-
fication conditions for both singular and nonsingular systems. The singular case applies to our
targeting rule models where the number of shocks are equal to the number of observations, while
the nonsingular case applies to the instrument rule based models where we have an additional
unsystematic interest rate shock.
It is important to note that the Komunjer and Ng (2011) identification test only applies to
covariance stationary processes. Therefore, the parameters associated with Markov-switching
shock variances cannot be incorporated into the test.4 As for monetary policy changes, we can
solve our model assuming that monetary policy stays in one regime, even though the private
agents in the economy are aware that there is a probability of monetary policy switching to a
different regime. In addition, the test can only applied to the parameters that enter into the
model solution. Therefore, we cannot test the identification of parameters that only contribute to
data means such as πA and γQ, while the identification of the real interest rate, rA, can be tested
as it links to the discount factor, β. This also implies that we will not be able to apply Komunjer
and Ng (2011) to asses the identification of the instrument rule which allows for switches in the
3Geweke (1992) convergence diagnostics indicate that convergence is achieved. These are available upon request.
4To consider the case of switches in shock volatility we employ Koop et al (2013) as discussed in Section E.2.
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inflation target (i.e. Rule-Target in Table 2).
For the results under discretion and commitment presented in Table 2, we have the parameter
vector θ ≡ (σ, α, ϕ, ζ, θ, ω1, ω2, ω3, ωπ(s=2), ρ
z, ρµ, ρξ, σz(S=1), σµ(S=1), σξ(S=1), r
A, p11, p22) of
dimension nθ = 18. To apply the test, we solve for the model and find a minimal representation
of the solution as follows
X1t+1 = A(θ)X1t +B(θ)εt+1,
Yt+1 = C(θ)X1t +D(θ)εt+1.
In this new system, X1t+1 ≡
(
zˆt, µˆt, ξˆt, yˆt, πˆt
)′
and nX = 5. Yt+1 ≡ (∆GDPt, INFt, INTt)
and εt ≡ (ε
z
t , ε
µ
t , ε
ξ
t ) are the observables and shocks. As nY = nε = 3, the model is square.
Proposition 2-S in Komunjer and Ng (2011) can be employed to assess identification. As for
quasi-commitment, the parameter vector θ ≡ (υ, σ, α, ϕ, ζ, θ, ω1, ω2, ω3, ωπ(s=2), ρ
z, ρµ,
ρξ, σz(S=1), σµ(S=1), σξ(S=1), r
A, p11, p22) has dimension of nθ = 19. However, its minimal
representation is consistent with Discretion and Commitment.
Using the same notation as in Komunjer and Ng (2011), we check the rank of ∆s(θ0) which
is the matrix of partial derivatives of δs (θ, T, U) evaluated at (θ0, InX , Inε) .
∆s(θ0) ≡
(
∂δs (θ, InX , Inε)
∂θ
∂δs (θ, InX , Inε)
∂vecT
∂δs (θ, InX , Inε)
∂vecU
)
θ=θ0
≡ (∆sΛ(θ0) ∆
s
T (θ0) ∆
s
U (θ0)) .
The rank of ∆s(θ0) required for identification is
rank(∆s(θ0)) = rank (∆
s
Λ(θ0) ∆
s
T (θ0) ∆
s
U (θ0))
= nθ + n
2
X + n
2
ε.
As for the rule-based model, we add an additional unsystematic interest rate shock, and thus
εt ≡ (ε
z
t , ε
µ
t , ε
ξ
t , ε
R
t ). Therefore, Proposition 2-NS in Komunjer and Ng (2011) is used to study
identification when nY < nε. The parameter vector θ ≡ (σ, α, ϕ, ζ, θ, ρ
R
s=1, ψ1,s=1, ψ2,s=1,
ρRs=2, ψ1,s=2, ψ2,s=2, ρ
z, ρµ, ρξ, σz(S=1), σµ(S=1), σξ(S=1), σR(S=1), r
A, p11, p22) has a dimension
of nθ = 21. In addition, as we allow for a lagged interest rate in the generalized Taylor rule,
X1t+1 ≡
(
zˆt, µˆt, ξˆt, yˆt, πˆt, Rˆt
)′
and nX = 6.
Again, adopting the notation of Komunjer and Ng (2011), for the nonsingular system, we check
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the rank of ∆s(θ0) which is the matrix of partial derivatives of δ
s (θ, T ) evaluated at (θ0, InX ) .
∆NS(θ0) ≡
(
∂δNS (θ, InX )
∂θ
∂δNS (θ, InX )
∂vecT
)
θ=θ0
≡
(
∆NSΛ (θ0) ∆
NS
T (θ0)
)
.
The rank of ∆s(θ0) required for identification is
rank(∆NS(θ0)) = rank
(
∆NSΛ (θ0) ∆
NS
T (θ0)
)
= nθ + n
2
X .
As in Komunjer and Ng (2011). we also consider 11 levels of tolerance along with the Matlab
default to analyze the ranks of ∆s(θ0) and ∆
NS(θ0) for both the singular and nonsingular sys-
tems. We use the change in rank as tolerance tightens to identify problematic parameters. The
Komunjer and Ng (2011) test does not indicate that any parameters are unidentified. In Table
E1 the required rank for identification of each model is presented, along with the Tol at which
the model passes the rank requirement.
Table E1: Komunjer and Ng’s (2011) identification test
Tol ∆sΛ ∆
s
T ∆
s
U ∆
s Pass
Discretion
Required 18 25 9 52
Regime 1 More Conservative e− 10 18 25 9 52 YES
Regime 2 Less Conservative e− 9 18 25 9 52 YES
Commitment
Required 18 25 9 52
Regime 1 More Conservative e− 5 18 25 9 52 YES
Regime 2 Less Conservative e− 5 18 25 9 52 YES
Quasi-Commitment
Required 19 25 9 53
Regime 1 More Conservative e− 6 19 25 9 53 YES
Regime 2 More Conservative, reneging e− 10 19 25 9 53 YES
Regime 3 Less Conservative e− 6 19 25 9 53 YES
Regime 4 Less Conservative, reneging e− 10 19 25 9 53 YES
Rule - Parameters
Required 21 36 — 57
Regime 1 More Conservative e− 7 21 36 — 57 YES
Regime 2 Less Conservative e− 7 21 36 — 57 YES
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E.2 Koop, Pesaran, Smith (2013)
Given that Komunjer and Ng (2011) only applies to covariance stationary processes, we also
analyze the identification of the remaining parameters in our model using the Koop et al. (2013)
Bayesian learning-rate indicator. However, it is worth noting that this indicator does not propose
a ‘Yes/No’ answer to the question of whether a given parameter is identified as in Komunjer
and Ng (2011). It indicates the degree of identification. The advantage of this approach is that
it can be easily applied to models with Markov-switching parameters, since it requires only a
few additional steps beyond a conventional Bayesian estimation. This test is based on Bayesian
asymptotic theory. The theory states that the role of the prior of a parameter vanishes with
increasing sample size. As a result, the posterior of a parameter asymptotically converges to its
true value. Implementing this indicator involves simulating artificial datasets of increasing size
from a DSGE model, and then estimating this model using these datasets. A parameter is said to
be identified if its posterior precision increases with the sample size. However, if a parameter is
weakly or not identifiable, its posterior precision will be updated at a rate lower than the sample
size.
It is important to note that a prerequisite in using Koop et al. (2013) Bayesian learning
rate indicator is that a subset of parameters are known to be identifiable. A vector of model
parameters θ = [θu,θi]
′ is split into θi, known to be identified and θu under question. Therefore,
the results obtained from Komunjer and Ng (2011) are complementary in applying this indicator,
such that we use Koop et al. (2013) to assess those parameters that are unable to be included in
our application Komunjer and Ng (2011). For example, under discretion, θi ≡ (σ, α, ϕ, ζ, θ, ω1,
ω2, ω3, ωπ(s=2), ρ
z, ρµ, ρξ, σz(S=1), σµ(S=1), σξ(S=1), r
A, p11, p22) and θu ≡ (q11, q22, σz(S=2),
σµ(S=2), σξ(S=2), π
A, γQ), where θu includes parameters associated with Markov-switching shock
variances.
In addition, Koop et al. (2013) assume Gaussian priors for model parameters in order to
obtain an analytical solution for the posterior precision when the sample period reaches infinity.
However, for most DSGE models in the literature, the priors are non-gaussian. Although the
assumption of Gaussian priors can be relaxed, the exact expression of the posterior precision
will differ from those illustrated in Koop et al. (2013). Caglar et al. (2011) demonstrate how to
apply this indicator to a medium-sized DSGE model with more complicated priors. They suggest
treating the Hessian at the posterior mode as the measure of posterior precision. We do not
present the technical details of this test as these can be found in Koop et al. (2013).
To implement the Bayesian learning rate indicator, we first need to produce samples of artificial
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data from our models. Models that incorporate Markov-switching parameters complicate the data
generating processes (DGPs). To simulate data from a Markov-switching model, we need to set
not only the model parameters but also the probabilities of each regime. We set the parameters
equal to the posteriors presented in Table 2. In addition, we generate the probabilities of different
sample sizes of T = 100, 1000, 10000, 20000. Unlike the fixed parameter model used to generate
artificial data discussed in Koop et al. (2013) and Caglar et al. (2011), we cannot generate a single
artificial dataset of T = 20000 and then take subsets of it to produce smaller subsamples. This is
because for our Markov-switching models the probabilities in each sample size should correspond
to the estimated transition probabilities (i.e.p11, p22, q11, q22 ). Therefore, the generated artificial
datasets for smaller T are not subsamples of larger T. This may contribute to the variation in
the results across samples. However, we try to make the use of this indicator as comparable as
possible across models. To do so, we use the same seed for the random number generator for all
DGPs from our models presented in Table 2.
Table E2: Posterior precision divided by sample size
Parameters n = 100 n = 1000 n = 10000 n = 20000
Discretion - Parameters associated with the MS shock volatility
σξ(S=2) 2.646 0.924 2.773 1.323
σµ(S=2) 3.399 1.051 2.950 1.726
σz(S=2) 4.331 1.209 2.907 1.677
q11 16.171 3.220 7.444 5.666
q22 12.066 16.622 11.746 11.687
πA 0.037 0.010 0.012 0.028
γQ 4.455 4.103 5.011 3.568
Rule-Target - Parameters associated with the MS inflation targets & shock volatility
σξ(S=2) 0.876 0.659 0.783 0.879
σµ(S=2) 0.277 0.038 0.010 0.008
σz(S=2) 0.325 0.965 0.772 0.859
σR(S=2) 0.164 0.035 0.004 0.003
πAs=1 0.154 0.180 0.248 0.188
πAs=2 0.206 0.259 0.215 0.143
γQ 2.638 3.641 2.816 3.104
p11 5.691 1.552 0.012 1.999
p22 5.513 2.486 0.283 0.127
q11 9.559 9.515 13.602 10.390
q22 2.590 2.090 1.216 1.755
In Table E2 we only present the parameters whose identification cannot be verified by using
Komunjer and Ng (2011) under discretion and the instrument rule with Markov-switching inflation
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targets.5 As discussed in Koop et al. (2013), the posterior precision of identified parameters
need not to rise monotonically with T. The posterior precision may, in fact, fall before rising
depending on the prior type. In addition, Koop et al. (2013) show that the posterior precision
of an unidentified parameter will shrink to zero very quickly as T increases. To make our results
robust, we increase T = 10000,the largest sample size used in Koop et al. (2013) to T = 20000.
It can be seen that no element of the normalized posterior precision of θu collapses to zero
when T = 20000. However, for the instrument rule with Markov-switching inflation targets, the
posterior precision of standard deviations of the cost-push shock and interest rate rule shock
(i.e.σµ(S=2) and σR(S=2)) decline quickly with the enlargement of T.
F Model Selection
Bayes factors are used to rank descriptions of policy in the main text. Alternatively, model
posterior probabilities can be calculated to evaluate relative model fit. Table F1 presents posterior
probabilities for models in Table 2. An equal model prior probability is placed on the five
competing models. The model posterior probability is then given by
p(Mk|Y ) =
p(Y1:T , |Mk)
Σnk=1p(Y1:T , |Mk)
, n = 5, (30)
where p (Y1:T , |Mk) is the marginal data density for each model. It can be seen that even though
equal model priors are placed on the five competing models, the data chooses to tilt the posterior
probability towards discretion.
Table F1: model posterior probabilities
Discretion Rule - Parameters Rule - Target
Quasi-
Commitment
Commitment
0.99 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
The posterior probabilities are often used as weights for model averaging to forecast future
observations. Forecasting applications of Bayesian model averaging in the economics literature
include Min and Zellner (1993), Wright (2008) and Del Negro et al. (2016).
While it is generally preferable to average across all models with nonzero posterior proba-
bilities, we use the posterior probabilities for model selection to choose one model that has the
highest posterior probability to conduct policy analysis. As discussed in Del Negro (2011), a
5The rule-based model with fixed parameters are identifiable as indicated by Komunjer and Ng (2011). We can
provide the results of the Koop et.al. (2013) test for the other models in Table 2 upon request. In all cases all
parameters are identified.
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Table G1: Full Table 3 No Switching
Parameters Simple Rule
Quasi-
Commitment
Discretion Commitment
Model Parameters
σ 2.802
[2.407,3.188]
2.254
[1.904,2.604]
2.722
[2.338,3.101]
2.832
[2.477,3.062]
α 0.779
[0.751,0.807]
0.798
[0.776,0.822]
0.760
[0.734,0.786]
0.768
[0.734,0.789]
ζ 0.103
[0.039,0.166]
0.170
[0.087,0.252]
0.156
[0.066,0.241]
0.594
[0.489,0.737]
θ 0.823
[0.685,0.964]
0.421
[0.210,0.627]
0.476
[0.267,0.680]
0.643
[0.444,0.782]
ϕ 2.417
[2.005,2.833]
1.835
[1.443,2.219]
2.387
[2.146,2.627]
2.312
[2.046,2.749]
Shock Processes
ρξ 0.899
[0.859 0.941]
0.894
[0.862 0.927]
0.845
[0.806 0.885]
0.862
[0.793 0.903]
ρµ 0.500
[0.246 0.747]
0.951
[0.926 0.976]
0.947
[0.922 0.974]
0.968
[0.948 0.989]
ρz 0.320
[0.219 0.418]
0.217
[0.168 0.265]
0.223
[0.172 0.275]
0.199
[0.132 0.241]
σξ 0.987
[0.715 1.247]
1.104
[0.647 1.550]
0.763
[0.486 1.039]
0.983
[0.706 1.165]
σµ 0.567
[0.341 0.788]
0.448
[0.255 0.629]
0.489
[0.356 0.613]
3.628
[2.816 4.916]
σz 0.797
[0.731 0.863]
0.845
[0.771 0.915]
0.827
[0.756 0.896]
0.770
[0.701 0.815]
σR 0.251
[0.227 0.273]
— — —
continued on the next page
model selection approach is likely to provide a good approximation if the posterior probability of
one model is very close to one, the probabilities associated with all other specifications are very
small.
G Additional Results
This section contains additional results not reported in the main paper.
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Table G1: Full Table 3 Estimation Results - No Switching — continued
Parameters Simple Rule
Quasi-
Commitment
Discretion Commitment
Data Means
rA 0.706
[0.246,1.139]
0.759
[0.143,1.330]
0.966
[0.352,1.569]
1.088
[0.459,1.540]
πA 4.746
[3.800,5.677]
2.586
[1.899,3.095]
2.656
[1.008,4.221]
4.050
[3.642,4.674]
γQ 0.688
[0.547,0.826]
0.737
[0.613,0.861]
0.716
[0.593,0.835]
0.726
[0.594,0.797]
Policy Parameters
ρR 0.791
[0.756,0.826]
— — —
ψ1 1.716
[1.455,1.972]
— — —
ψ2 0.492
[0.290,0.697]
— — —
ω1 — 0.703
[0.552,0.861]
0.458
[0.287,0.627]
0.627
[0.490,0.808]
ω2 — 0.828
[0.727,0.935]
0.758
[0.628,0.901]
0.446
[0.316,0.620]
ω3 — 0.390
[0.163,0.619]
0.451
[0.213,0.692]
0.489
[0.268,0.712]
υ — 0.556
[0.329,0.816]
— —
Log Marginal Data Densities and Bayes Factors
Geweke (1999) −841.01
(1.00)
−841.67
(1.94)
−842.49
(4.41)
−855.43
(1.84e+6)
Sims et al. (2008) −841.09
(1.00)
−841.54
(1.57)
−842.69
(4.96)
−858.26
(2.85e+7)
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Table G2: Full Table 4 Switches in Policy Only
Parameters Discretion
Quasi-
Commitment
Rule - Parameters Rule - Target Commitment
Model Parameters
σ 2.896
[2.500,3.288]
2.550
[2.190,2.896]
2.621
[2.382,2.861]
2.791
[2.403,3.187]
2.921
[2.560,3.277]
α 0.731
[0.706,0.758]
0.755
[0.733,0.777]
0.775
[0.747,0.803]
0.779
[0.750,0.807]
0.770
[0.744,0.796]
ζ 0.155
[0.069,0.239]
0.182
[0.091,0.274]
0.102
[0.038,0.163]
0.123
[0.054,0.195]
0.229
[0.078,0.366]
θ 0.479
[0.286,0.835]
0.371
[0.192,0.543]
0.825
[0.698,0.954]
0.810
[0.658,0.961]
0.606
[0.388,0.843]
ϕ 2.331
[1.916,2.757]
2.249
[1.861,2.632]
2.425
[2.025,2.848]
2.410
[2.003,2.846]
2.271
[1.872,2.679]
Shock Processes
ρξ 0.805
[0.766,0.844]
0.899
[0.868,0.929]
0.887
[0.850,0.927]
0.898
[0.858,0.941]
0.904
[0.877,0.933]
ρµ 0.957
[0.937,0.978]
0.942
[0.916,0.967]
0.501
[0.250,0.748]
0.499
[0.250,0.751]
0.986
[0.978,0.995]
ρz 0.213
[0.164,0.261]
0.218
[0.167,0.269]
0.307
[0.208,0.403]
0.317
[0.218,0.417]
0.210
[0.154,0.268]
σξ 0.515
[0.289,0.719]
0.851
[0.551,1.145]
0.981
[0.755,1.199]
0.848
[0.609,1.090]
0.797
[0.511,1.069]
σµ 0.444
[0.327,0.554]
0.628
[0.440,0.812]
0.275
[0.169,0.382]
0.569
[0.340,0.795]
2.325
[1.697,2.947]
σz 0.829
[0.755,0.896]
0.831
[0.760,0.902]
0.797
[0.169,0.382]
0.795
[0.727,0.861]
0.779
[0.711,0.846]
σR — — 0.235
[0.213,0.256]
0.252
[0.229,0.275]
—
Data Means
rA 0.766
[0.303,1.213]
0.997
[0.377,1.591]
0.695
[0.276,1.105]
0.662
[0.239,1.054]
0.975
[0.358,1.561]
πA(s=1) 2.683
[1.275,4.022]
2.097
[1.770,2.431]
3.736
[3.183,4.299]
4.234
[3.470,4.995]
3.064
[2.733,3.411]
πA(s=2) — — — 6.058[5.217,6.862]
—
γQ 0.683
[0.567,0.800]
0.722
[0.598,0.842]
0.677
[0.540,0.808]
0.681
[0.544,0.822]
0.741
[0.619,0.862]
continued on the next page
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Table G2: Full Table 4 Switches in Policy Only — continued
Parameters Discretion
Quasi-
Commitment
Rule - Parameters Rule - Target Commitment
Policy Parameters
ρR(s=1) — — 0.746
[0.708,0.786]
0.797
[0.762,0.831]
—
ρR(s=2) — — 0.845[0.794,0.900]
— —
ψ1(s=1) — — 2.075
[1.824,2.315]
1.805
[1.507,2.097]
—
ψ1(s=2) — — 0.909
[0.621,1.189]
— —
ψ2(s=1) — — 0.483
[0.309,0.645]
0.498
[0.285,0.714]
—
ψ2(s=2) — — 0.245
[0.098,0.393]
— —
ω1 0.259
[0.035,0.414]
0.633
[0.480,0.785]
— − 0.502
[0.331,0.666]
ω2 0.650
[0.460,0.847]
0.759
[0.631,0.893]
— − 0.523
[0.295,0.732]
ω3 0.442
[0.164,0.698]
0.349
[0.126,0.559]
— − 0.460
[0.205,0.710]
ωπ(s=1) 1 1 — − 1
ωπ(s=2) 0.347
[0.219,0.477]
0.348
[0.254,0.440]
— — 0.302
[0.194,0.414]
p11 0.978
[0.962,0.994]
0.860
[0.777,0.946]
0.962
[0.939,0.989]
0.956
[0.930,0.984]
0.979
[0.962,0.996]
p22 0.940
[0.900,0.981]
0.879
[0.819,0.941]
0.802
[0.734,0.870]
0.796
[0.722,0.876]
0.816
[0.735,0.901]
υ — 0.325
[0.239,0.411]
— — —
Log Marginal Data Densities and Bayes Factors
Geweke (1999) −810.98
(1.00)
−814.83
(47.0)
−825.33
(1.72e+6)
−831.74
(1.04e+9)
−832.85
(3.14e+9)
Sims et al. (2008) −811.24
(1.00)
−814.30
(21.21)
−825.44
(1.46e+6)
−831.81
(8.52e+8)
−832.98
(2.75e+9)
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Figure G1: Markov Switching Probabilities: Policy Switches Only
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less conservative reoptimization (quasi−commitment only)
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Figure G2: Quasi-commitment with different objectives
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